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The Capital Jury Project:
Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings
WILLIAM J. BOWERS*
INTRODUCTION
Now underway in fourteen states, the Capital Jury Project ("CJP") is a
multidisciplinary study of how capital jurors make their life or death
sentencing decisions.' Drawing upon three-to-four hour interviews with 80 to
120 capital jurors in each of the participating states, 2 the CJP is examining
the extent to which jurors' exercise of capital sentencing discretion is still
infected with, or now cured of, the arbitrariness which the United States
Supreme Court condemned in Furman v. Georgia,3 and the extent to which
the principal kinds of post-Furman guided discretion statutes are curbing
arbitrary decision-making--as the Court said they would in Gregg v.
Georgia4 and its companion cases.5
The research is being conducted by a consortium of university-based
investigators-chiefly criminologists, social psychologists, and law faculty
members-utilizing common data-gathering instruments and procedures. In
addition, where available, trial transcripts are being used in the analyses.
Interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are also being
conducted in some of these cases. Interviews with jurors in the target samples
are now virtually complete in seven of these states.
This Article introduces the Capital Jury Project and sets the stage for the
contributions and commentaries that follow. Part I sketches out the legal
context. It reviews the Supreme Court's condemnation of arbitrariness in
capital sentencing, the responses by states to curb such arbitrariness, the
Court's choice of "guided discretion" as the remedy to arbitrariness, and its
subsequent "deregulation" of guided discretion. Part I also reviews legal
criticism and empirical challenges to these reforms, as well as the Court's
response to these arguments and this evidence.
Part II examines the tension between the legal assumptions about how jurors
exercise their sentencing discretion and the empirical evidence of how jurors
actually make their decisions. This entails an examination of contrasting
* Principal Research Scientist, College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University. Ph.D.,
Columbia University, 1966; B.A., Washington and Lee University, 1957.
1. This research was initiated in 1990 with funding from the Law and Social Sciences Program
of the National Science Foundation, grant NSF SES-9013252.
2. In each of the eight states where the study was initiated, the target sample is 120 capital jurors
(four each from fifteen death cases and fifteen life cases). For the six states that subsequently joined the
project, the target sample is eighty jurors (four each from ten death cases and ten life cases).
Cases in which the defendant was sentenced to death will be referred to throughout this Symposium
as "death cases." Cases in which the jury imposed a sentence other than death, usually life
imprisonment, will be referred to as "life cases."
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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sentencing decision models suggested in the psychological literature on
decision-making and those implicit in the guided discretion capital statutes
enacted in the various states, and a review of previous empirical research on
how jurors make their capital sentencing decisions.
Part III then describes the CJP's research enterprise: the Project's
organization and objectives, the sampling and data collection strategies, the
development of the juror interview instrument, the maturation of the research
design, and the extension of the study beyond the initial sample of states. Part
III also identifies previous presentations and publications that draw upon this
research.
Part IV summarizes some provocative early findings of the CJP from states
where data collection has been completed (or nearly so). The data now
indicate, for example, that many jurors make their punishment decisions
prematurely, well before the sentencing phase of the trial; that many
misunderstand the judge's sentencing instructions in ways that favor the
imposition of the death penalty; and that many jurors are unwilling to accept
primary responsibility for their punishment decisions. These early findings
raise unsettling questions about the operation of the post-Furman capital
sentencing statutes-issues explored further in the contributions that follow
in this Symposium.
I. LEGAL CONTEXT
In the last quarter century, the United States Supreme Court has displayed
considerable ambivalence toward the capital jury. In 1971, the Court held that
capital statutes need not, and probably could not, guide the sentencing
discretion of capital jurors.6 One year later, the Court ruled that jurors'
(unguided) exercise of such discretion under existing statutes was unconstitu-
tionally arbitrary and capricious.7 After the states enacted new capital statutes
with sentencing guidelines, the Court changed its mind about "guided
discretion." It decided that these new statutes could, and would, remedy the
unconstitutional arbitrariness it found under prior capital sentencing schemes.8
But then, the Court appeared to have second thoughts about guided discretion.
It ruled that statutory guidelines must not restrict capital jurors' consideration
of mitigation,9 and need not restrict their consideration of aggravation.'
Indeed, the Court later went on to broaden the scope of constitutionally
acceptable aggravating considerations beyond the blameworthiness of the
defendant to include the character of the victim and the impact of the crime
on the victim's survivors." This zig-zag pattern of renouncing, requiring,
and then relaxing statutory guidance for capital sentencing discretion is, in
6. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
7. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring).
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
10. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1982).
11. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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broad terms, the legal context of the research being conducted by the members
of the CJP.
A. The Constitutional Problem and Its Remedies
In the historic 1972 Furman decision, the United States Supreme Court, in
a per curiam opinion, held that juries were imposing the death penalty in an
arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment. 2 States responded to the
Court's invalidation of their existing statutes with new laws designed to
remedy the arbitrariness in juries' life or death decisions. Some enacted
"mandatory" capital statutes intended to eliminate arbitrariness by doing away
with the jury's sentencing discretion; such statutes made death the only
punishment for specified forms of murder.' 3 Other states adopted "guided
discretion" capital statutes designed to control and direct jurors' exercise of
discretion by setting out standards or guidelines-typically aggravating and
mitigating considerations-to be applied by capital jurors in making their
sentencing decisions.
The Supreme Court reviewed these statutory schemes in 1976 and decided
that one kind, but not the other, would lawfully and effectively curb the
arbitrariness forbidden by Furman. The Court rejected the mandatory statutes
in Woodson v. North Carolina4 and Roberts v. Louisiana," declaring that
because "death is different" in kind from lesser punishments, the Eighth
Amendment requires "individualized treatment" in capital sentencing, and thus
prohibits a death sentence fixed by law.' 6 On the same day, however, in
Gregg v. Georgia,J7 Proffitt v. Florida," and Jurek v. Texas, 9 the Court
endorsed "guided discretion" capital statutes that divided the trial into separate
guilt and punishment phases and set forth guidelines and procedures for jurors
to follow during the punishment phase of the trial in making their sentencing
decisions.2' The Court held that statutes with such sentencing guidelines for
12. The exercise of capital sentencing discretion by juries was variously characterized by the
concurring Justices in Furman as "freakish," "wanton," "whimsical," "capricious," "random," "rare,"
"discriminatory," and "arbitrary." Justice Stewart, in particular, described the death penalty as "cruel and
unusual in the same way that being 'struck by lightning' is cruel and unusual." Furman, 408 U.S. at 309
(Stewart, J., concurring). In effect, the Court's constitutional ruling was grounded in what capital juries
actually do with "the discretion so regularly conferred upon them." Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
13. For example, North Carolina's statute made death the only punishment for a defendant convicted
of murder in the first or second degree. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976).
Likewise, Louisiana's statute provided for the automatic imposition of the death penalty on those
defendants convicted of first-degree murder. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 (1976).
14. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
15. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
16. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
17. 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
18. 428 U.S. 242, 251-58 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
19. 428 U.S. 262, 268-76 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
20. In Gregg, the Court held that a state could not impose the death penalty under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk of inflicting the penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
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capital jurors appeared, "[o]n their face," to remedy the arbitrariness ruled
unconstitutional in Furman,2 the earlier opinion of the Court in McGautha
to the contrary notwithstanding.22
Different forms of guided discretion statutes, known as "threshold,"
"balancing," and "directed" statutes, 23 survived constitutional scrutiny in
Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, respectively. Georgia's threshold statute requires
jurors to find at least one aggravating factor from a list specified in the statute
before imposing a death sentence; 24 once the jury finds the existence of an
The Court's lead opinion, delivered by Justice Stewart, reasoned that "where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.). In announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Stewart explained:
Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish.
The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's attention on the
particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual
defendant.... In this way the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly
and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative
guidelines.
Id. at 206-07.
21. Id. at 198.
22. Notably, the Court's holding in Gregg represented a fundamental turnaround in the Court's
stand on statutory standards to guide capital sentencing. One year prior to Furman, the Court had voiced
serious doubts about whether standards for capital sentencing could actually be articulated, much less
effectively guide jurors' exercise of capital discretion. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196-208. In McGautha,
the Court reasoned that:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators
which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond
present human ability.
Id. at 204.
Arguably, in light of the Court's stand in McGautha, and in view of the broader historical trend
toward the abolition of capital punishment, its 1976 decisions in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek were
aberrant, both in terms of constitutional doctrine and in historical direction. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
& GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 26-76 (1986). For a
discussion of the likely influence of public opinion about the death penalty on the Court's 1976
decisions upholding guided discretion statutes, see William Bowers, Capital Punishment and
Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 157
(1993).
23. For a discussion of the distinctions among these different types of early post-Furman capital
statutes, see Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1980), and Note, Discretion
and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1699-1712 (1974).
Acker and Lanier provide a detailed discussion of the forms that these statutes now take. See James R.
Acker, Jr. & C.S. Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigating Factors in Capital Punishment
Laws, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 299 (1994).
24. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1990). The aggravating factors enumerated in Georgia's
current capital statute are as follows:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person
with a prior conviction for a capital felony;
(2) The offense of mdrder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery...;
(3) The offender [in the commission of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping, knowingly
created a risk to more than one person by employing a weapon normally hazardous to more
than one person];
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
1046
1995] CJP RATIONALE, DESIGN, & PREVIEW OF EARLYFINDINGS 1047
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, its discretion is unguided in consi-
dering additional aggravating and mitigating factors.2 5 Florida's balancing
statute requires jurors to weigh aggravating factors26 against mitigating
(5) The murder of ajudicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor, former
district attorney or solicitor was committed during or because of the exercise of his official
duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder... as an agent or employee of
another person;
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee, or
fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties;
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful
custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement;
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing
a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.
Id.
The above quoted statute is identical to that which was challenged in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976). See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (discussing the
aggravating factors listed in the Georgia statute).
25. The only qualification is that jurors may not ignore or disregard whatever relevant evidence of
mitigation the defense proffers. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see also McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (striking down a unanimity requirement for mitigating evidence
in the Maryland death penalty statute); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (invalidating North
Carolina's unanimity requirement for mitigating circumstances). The standards set forth in Eddings,
McKoy, and Mills differ from the pre-Gregg statutes, which allowed the jury to disregard mitigating
evidence.
26. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1995). The enumerated aggravating
circumstances in the Florida statute are:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment or placed
on community control.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice,
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit, any robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the
unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from custody.
() The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
government function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
(j) The victim... was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
(k) The victim.., was an elected or appointed public official engaged in the performance of
his official duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to the
victim's official capacity.
Id.
Factors (a) through (h) of the current Florida statute are identical to the statute that was challenged
in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1976-1977);
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6 (listing the aggravating factors in the then-current Florida statute). Factors
(i) through (k)-focusing on premeditation and the characteristics of the victim-were not part of the
statute challenged in Proffitt.
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factors27 listed in the statute in making their sentencing decision; jurors then
recommend life or death depending on the assessment of the relative "weight"
of the aggravators and mitigators. Texas' directed statute restricts the death
penalty to persons convicted of capital felonies under aggravating circum-
stances,2" of the kind Georgia and Florida statutes use to guide jurors'
sentencing discretion. Under Texas' statute, the jurors' imposition of a life or
death sentence is then strictly determined by their findings on three proposi-
tions: the likely future dangerousness of the defendant, the defendant's intent
to kill or level of responsibility for the victim's death, and the existence of
any mitigating circumstances which would warrant a life sentence.
2 9
27. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6). The enumerated mitigating circumstances in the statute are:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and
his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. This list of mitigating factors is unchanged from the statute challenged in Proffitt. See id.
§ 921.141(6) (West Supp. 1976-1977); ProJfttt, 428 U.S. 248 n.6 (reprinting the Florida statute).
28. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 1994). These aggravating circumstances include:
(1) The person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful discharge of an
official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman;
(2) The person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, burglary, aggravated sexual assault, arson, or obstruction or retaliation;
(3) The person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or
employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
(4) The person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal
institution;
(5) The person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, [murders an employee of the penal
institution or commits murder as part of a conspiracy];
(6) The person [while incarcerated for certain offenses] murders another;
(7) The person murders more than one person [during the same criminal event or as part of a
common scheme];
(8) The person murders an individual under six years of age.
Id.
Since the decision in Jurek v. Texas, 262 U.S. 268 (1976), aggravators (6)-(8) were added; aggravator
(2) replaced "forcible rape" with "aggravated sexual assault," and added "obstruction or retaliation" to
the list of aggravators and dropped "robbery" from the list; aggravator (5) was expanded to include
conspiracy (to commit murder) while incarcerated. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1974);
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268 (discussing the elements of the Texas Penal Code). Although these changes
extend the variety of offenses that qualify as death-eligible murder, eliminating robbery as an
accompanying felony circumstance decidedly restricted the number of offenders who could be convicted
of capital murder, given the frequency of robberies in which a murder occurs.
29. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2 (West Supp. 1995). The Texas statute requires
the jury to address these three issues in a proceeding that takes place after returning a guilty verdict
against the defendant for any one of the enumerated categories of murder listed in footnote 28. Id. art.
37.071, § 2(a). Specifically, the jury must answer the following questions:
(1) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(2) In cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the jury to find
the defendant guilty [for his own conduct or criminally responsible for the conduct of another],
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Other states have adopted variations on the threshold, balancing, and
directed statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. ° Several states, such
as Virginia,3' Louisiana,32 and California,33 following Texas' lead, have
narrowed the definition of capital murder by restricting it to murders
committed under specified aggravating conditions. A few states, such as
Virginia 34 and Oklahoma,3 also followed Texas' approach by making the
defendant's future dangerousness a prominent sentencing consideration.
Oregon has adhered most strictly to Texas' directed model.36 Other states,
including South Carolina3  and Kentucky,38 follow Georgia's threshold
model and provide that the finding of a single aggravating circumstance is
sufficient for the jury to impose a death sentence. Most states, however, have
followed Florida's lead by having jurors weigh or balance aggravating and
mitigating considerations.39 Some of these states, including New Jersey40 and
whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually cause the
death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human
life would be taken.
Id. art. 37.07 1, § 2(b). If the jury finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
answer to each of these two questions is "yes" id. art. 37.071, § 2(c), the jury must then answer the
following question:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the
offense, that defendant's character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the
defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a
sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.
Id. art. 37.071, § 2(e). If the jury returns a negative finding to this question, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death. Id. art. 37.071, § 2(g). If the jury returns a negative finding on either of the first two
questions or an affirmative finding on the question of mitigating circumstances, the court shall sentence
the defendant to life imprisonment. Id.
As under the current statute, at the time of the Jurek decision, the defendant's sentence was strictly
determined by the jury's answers to three questions. The current questions, however, differ slightly from
those which were at issue in Jurek. Question (I) (regarding future dangerousness) is the same as it was
in the statute reviewed in Jurek. Question (2) (regarding criminal responsibility and responsibility for
the killing) rephrased slightly the requirement regarding intent. Finally, question (3) explicitly
incorporates the issue of mitigation (which was absent from the statute at issue in Jurek) in place of a
question about victim provocation. For a discussion of the capital sentencing procedure challenged in
Jurek, see 428 U.S. at 269. These changes in the sentencing procedure came about as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See also Peggy M. Tobolowsky,
What Hath Penry Wrought?: Mitigating Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 345, 362-64 (1992).
30. A few states have adopted capital statutes that give sentencing authority to the trial judge rather
than the jury. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994-1.995); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515 (1987). Although the Supreme Court has found these few "judge only" statutes
constitutionally acceptable, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), the statutes are an anomalous
subgroup which falls beyond the scope of the CJP's research on how jurors exercise capital sentencing
discretion.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994).
32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1990).
35. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 1983).
36. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.095, 163.105, 163.150 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
38. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
39. Twenty-one of 36 death penalty states employ some type of balancing statute. See Steven
Hombuckle, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Legal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX.
L. REv. 441, 448 n.38 (1994).
40. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-3c (West 1982.& Supm. 1994).
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Pennsylvania, 4' require or prohibit a death sentence depending on the balance
between aggravating and mitigating factors, while others, including Tennes-
see42 and North Carolina,43 leave the jury's life or death decision open, to
be informed but not dictated by the balance of factors. Notably, in some states
with balancing statutes such as Alabama,44 Florida,45 and Indiana,46 the
jury's sentencing decision is not binding, and the trial judge may override the
jury's sentence.47
B. The Court's Misgivings About the Remedies
Following its decision in Gregg, the Supreme Court appeared to have
second thoughts about statutory guidelines. After requiring that state statutes
guide sentencing discretion, the Court then began to discount such guidelines
in a series of decisions that Robert Weisberg has aptly labeled "deregulating
death. 45 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court first lifted the statutory restrictions
on what could be considered by a jury in mitigation.49 The Court in Lockett
ruled that the constitutional requirement of "individualized treatment" in
capital sentencing, as articulated in Woodson v. North Carolina,50 meant that
jurors could consider any mitigating factor, not just those set forth as
standards in the statutes."' Since deciding in Lockett that non-statutory
41. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(c)(iv) (1982 & Supp. 1994).
42. TENN. STAT. ANN. § 39-13-204(e)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983 & Supp. 1994).
44. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1994).
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
46. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
47. Of the states referred to in this paragraph, only Oklahoma and Oregon are not under study as
part of the CJP. See infra Part III.B.l.a for a discussion of the participating states and the criteria for
sampling states.
48. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 305.
49. 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion).
50. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("[W]e believe
that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.") (citation omitted).
51. According to the Lockett plurality, "The sentencer ... [cannot] be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at
604 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that it was reversible error to exclude evidence of the defendant's ability to
make a peaceful adjustment to prison life as an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to
the sentencing determination). In Woodson, Justice Stewart stated that any exclusion of the
"compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind" that are relevant
to the sentencer's decision would fail to treat all persons as "uniquely individual human beings."
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
Excluded from consideration in mitigation have been factors such as the death penalty's deterrent
'efficacy. See Illinois v. Yates, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 981 (1984); see also
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 ("Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to
exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense.") (emphasis added). Jurors are also precluded from considering descriptions
of execution methods in mitigation. Underwood v. Indiana, 535 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1989); LeVasseur v.
Virginia, 304 S.E.2d 644 (Va. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
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factors may be offered in mitigation in order to provide "individualized
treatment" as required by the "death is different" doctrine articulated in
Woodson,52 the Court has held that non-statutory mitigating factors must not
be ignored by jurors,53 that (according to some members of the Court) trial
judges must actually instruct juries to consider non-statutory mitigators, 54
and that such factors need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence
to a single juror in order to block a unanimous verdict for imposition of a
death sentence.55 These decisions thus effectively removed juror consider-
ation of mitigation from the guidance of the statutory provisions and from the
monitoring of the appellate courts.
The Court then relaxed the guidance of statutory aggravating considerations
as well. In Zant v. Stephens,56 the Court set a minimum requirement for
statutory aggravating considerations and opened the door to the consideration
of non-statutory aggravators. The Court in Zant held that only a single
statutory aggravator need be found for a death sentence to be imposed;57
thereafter, the jury's exercise of sentencing discretion could be virtually
unguided.5 8 Under state law, jurors might still be prohibited from considering
non-statutory aggravators in making their sentencing decisions,59 but no such
guidance is constitutionally required.
Indeed, the Court also extended the scope of non-statutory aggravators to
include previously unacceptable considerations. In Payne v. Tennessee,60 the
Court held that personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact
of the killing on the victim's family, friends, and community can be presented
to jurors during the sentencing phase of the trial.6 ' By permitting "victim
52. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
53. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). '
54. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding an Arizona statute
that required the defendant to prove the existence of mitigating factors by a preponderance of the
evidence); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 609 n.16 (reserving the question whether a state may require
the defendant "to bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to the existence of mitigating circumstances').
56.462 U.S. 862 (1983). For an insightful discussion of the way in which Zant restructured the role
of statutory aggravating. factors in capital sentencing, see Weisberg, supra note 48, at 349-50.
57. Zant, 462 U.S. at 873-80. The narrowing of the class of convicted murderers to those eligible
for a death sentence could be accomplished either at the guilt or punishment phase of the trial. For
example, the Texas statute accomplished this at the guilt stage by requiring death-eligible murderers to
be convicted of at least one of eight kinds of aggravated murder. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31; see
also supra note 28 and accompanying text. Florida and Georgia do so by enumerating aggravators, at
least one of which must be found by the jury during the sentencing stage of the trial. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b); see also supra notes 24, 26, and accompanying text.
58. Zant, 462 U.S. at 880. The jury's discretion is not, however, entirely unguided; it must not
ignore evidence and arguments presented in support of statutory or non-statutory mitigators, as required
by Lockett and Eddings. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
59. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (stating that "[a]ggravating factors shall be limited to the
following") (emphasis added); see also id. § 921.141(3) (stating that "[n]otwithstanding the
recommendation of the majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death') (emphasis added).
60. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
61. Id. at 827.
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impact" evidence and arguments, the Payne Court thus reversed earlier
rulings 2 that were explicitly intended to insulate the sentencing process from
the arbitrary effects of emotional, inflammatory, or prejudicial influences,
apart from the defendant's blameworthiness.
63
Finally, the Court decided not to require that the jury's sentencing decision
be monitored for compliance with state statutory guidelines by means of a
"proportionality review." In Pulley v. Harris,64 the Court confirmed that the
relaxation of guidance in Woodson and Zant, together with the general
absence of a record of jury findings of aggravation and mitigation, means that
the jury's sentencing decisions cannot be meaningfully reviewed for
proportionality. This conclusion was aptly foreshadowed by then-Justice
Rehnquist in his Woodson dissent:
Under the Georgia system, the jury is free to recommend life imprison-
ment, as opposed to death, for no stated reason whatever. The Georgia
Supreme Court cannot know, therefore, when it is reviewing jury sentences
for life in capital cases, whether the jurors found aggravating circumstances
present, but nonetheless decided to recommend mercy, or instead found no
aggravating circumstances at all and opted for mercy. So the "proportional-
ity" type of review, while it would perhaps achieve its objective if there
were no possible factual lacunae in the jury verdicts, will not achieve its
objective because there are necessarily such lacunae.
Identical defects seem inherent in the systems of appellate review
provided in Texas and Florida, for neither requires the sentencing authority
which concludes that a death penalty is inappropriate to state what
mitigating factors were found to be present or whether certain aggravating
factors urged by the prosecutor were actually found to be lacking.6
5
In effect, the Supreme Court's opinions since Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek have
relaxed both statutory restraints on, and judicial scrutiny of, guided discretion
in capital sentencing.66
62. The Payne decision reversed the Court's explicit ban on "victim impact statements" announced
in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808, and on prosecutorial
argument to the same effect in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne, 501
U.S. 808. Writing for the Court in Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained this reversal by declaring
that Booth and Gathers unfairly tipped the scales in favor of the defendant in a capital trial. Payne, 501
U.S. at 822.
63. In his Payne dissent, Justice Stevens declared that the Court had abandoned the fundamental
constitutional requirement that sentencing in a capital case be the product of a reasoned assessment of
the defendant's blameworthiness as reflected in the characteristics of the crime and of the defendant,
insulated from emotional influences associated with the victim's identity and how the victim's family
feels about the crime. Payne, 501 U.S. at 856-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
65. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 318 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. For an insightful analysis of the failure of the Court's past two decades of death penalty
jurisprudence to narrow, channel, and individualize the capital sentencing decision, see Carol S. Streiker
& Jordan M. Streiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation
of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming, 1995). For a further perspective on the Court's
role in monitoring the application of state law, including exceptions to the overall deregulation trend,
see Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1643 (1994). For the implications of this
jurisprudence on the substantive law of murder, particularly the shift from purpose and motive to act
and result in grading murder, see Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375 (1994).
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C. Doubts About the Remedies
The solutions that the Court approved in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek (to the
arbitrariness it found unconstitutional in Furman) focused squarely on the
capital jury. Statutory sentencing guidelines were the "cure." They could vary
widely-from the narrowly restrictive directed statutes, to the various shades
of the balancing statutes, to the minimal requirements of the threshold
statutes.67 Although the Court later decided that the Constitution required
only the minimal guidance of a threshold-type statute, more restrictive
standards could be required under state law. The Court's supposition that the
pre-Furman arbitrariness could be remedied by these jury-centered statutory
reforms, however, ran headlong into unsympathetic argument and evidence
from several sources: namely, the reasoning of legal critics, evidence of
biased sentencing outcomes under the new statutes, and research showing pro-
prosecution effects of death-qualification jury selection procedures.
Critics have charged that the arbitrariness condemned in Furman still exists
under the guided discretion statutes endorsed in Gregg; indeed, some argue
that these statutory reforms may have actually added to the arbitrariness of
capital jury decision-making. The critics fault various statutory aggravating
circumstances. Some aggravating factors (for example, the fact that the crime
was heinous, vile, or wanton, or that the defendant will be dangerous in the
future) are said to be too vague, ambiguous, or uncertain to provide any
meaningful guidance to the jury.68 Some factors listed as mitigators (for
example, mental or emotional disturbance, or drug/alcohol involvement) may
actually be regarded by jurors as aggravators, owing to their presumed
contribution to future violence. 69 The role of factors listed as aggravators
(for example, the existence of an accompanying felony or the fact that the
crime was perpetrated for financial gain) permit the same element of a crime
to be considered twice in aggravation. 7' The legal terms "aggravation" and
"mitigation" are unfamiliar and confusing to many jurors, 7' and jurors are
67. See supra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981);' George F. Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes:
Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1343 (1977);
James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness
in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 449 (1989); Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous"
Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases: The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986).
69. See, e.g., Ellen F. Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 291 (1989).
70. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 452-53
(1986); Neil Skene, Review of Capital Cases: Does the Florida Supreme Court Know What It's Doing?,
15 STETSON L. REV. 263, 314-17 (1986) (discussing "doubling"--which may twice penalize the
defendant on the identical evidence).
71. See, e.g., James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses
to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 278
(1988); Lorelei Sontag, Deciding Death: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of Penalty Phase Jury
Instructions and Capital Decision-Making 111-12 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California (Santa Cruz), reprinted by UMI Dissertation Services).
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typically confused by the court's instructions about how to weigh aggravating
against mitigating factors.72
Indeed, there is conjecture 73 and some evidence 4 that the guided discre-
tion statutes actually create a "tilt" toward death, or a presumption in the
minds of jurors that death is the appropriate punishment. Thus, a vigorous
denial of guilt in the first phase of the bifurcated trial tends to nullify a
convincing demonstration of remorse before the same jury at the punishment
stage." The defendant's prior record of crime and violence may be used as
an aggravating factor in what can be a dramatic courtroom retrial of past
offenses.76 Furthermore, the prosecution's argument for the death penalty can
be given a veneer of legal authorization in the form of a tally of aggravation
minus mitigation.7 7 This mechanistic counting of factors may actually
diminish the jurors' personal sense of moral responsibility for their sentencing
decisions.7" There is also evidence that the new statutes with many specific
aggravators and at least one catch-all aggravator may serve more as a foil
than as a guide for jurors' exercise of sentencing discretion. 79
Almost imperceptibly, the guided discretion statutes appear to have created
a "new law of murder,"80 in which objective indicators of actions and results
72. See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433
(1994); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases,
79 CORNELL L.J. 1, 4 (1993); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing
Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995); Luginbuhl & Middendorf, supra note
71, at 266.
73. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 48, at 330-31.
74. See, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 25 (1987-88) (studying jurors' use
of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in ten Florida trials).
75. Coordinating the defense used in the guilt phase with the mitigation case put forward in the
penalty phase is a difficult matter. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 328-34 (1983).
76. Weisberg has illustrated this point as follows:
[Since] crimes such as rape and armed robbery include violence to the person as an essential
legal element, ... the state need not demonstrate the particular violence with which the
defendant committed the old crime. But rather than rely on the cold formality of the conviction
record, the state nevertheless tries to exploit the dramatic form of the minitrial to impress the
sentencer with the colorfil underlying facts of the old conviction. The defendant frequently
tries to "plea-bargain" his way out of this minitrial by stipulating to the conviction for the old
violent crime. But some state courts have permitted the state to hold the minitrial anyway,
partly for the ironic reason that the minitrial requires the state to prove the aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. But in an infinite regress of the penalty trial, they
also permit the defendant to put on evidence specifically mitigating the old crime. The penalty
trial then contains a mini-guilt trial which contains elements of a mini-penalty trial.
Weisberg, supra note 48, at 338 (footnotes omitted).
77. See id. at 321.
78. See id.
79. Glenn Pierce and I found that the death penalty was imposed in Georgia and Florida for killings
of roughly equal aggravation (when gauged by objective indicators), but that juries in Florida-where
aggravating factors must outweigh mitigating factors-(I) found more statutory aggravating factors, and
(2) more often found the catch-all "wanton, vile, and outrageous" aggravator, than did juries in
Georgia-where a single aggravator is sufficient for a death sentence. William J. Bowers & Glenn L.
Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ.
563, 626-29 (1980); see also WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 353-58 (1984).
80. See Givelber, supra note 66. Givelber observes that "[tihe very proposal that the drafters of the
Model Penal Code rejected-a new class of capital murder plus discretionary sentencing--on the
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have largely displaced subjective considerations of motive and purpose in the
capital sentencing decision. This shift from premeditated to aggravated killing
as death-eligible murder purports to make the sentencing decision more
objective and rational.8' But the objective aggravators with the broadest
reach, such as felony murder, tend to "legalize" otherwise impermissible
disparities (e.g., by race of perpetrator and victim) in who is death-eligible."
To the extent that such aggravators predominate in jurors' thinking about the
appropriate punishment, they threaten to undermine the fundamental role of
moral judgment in assessing mitigation.83
Most weighty of the doubts about the Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek cures to the
Furman ills are surely those of former Justice Blackmun. Although he
endorsed these remedies in 1976, he concluded before retiring from the Court
in 1994 that two decades of experience with guided discretion capital statutes
shows that the nation's "death penalty experiment has failed."84 In his
Callins dissent, he observed:
[T]he consistency promised in Furman and the fairness to the individual
demanded in Lockett are not only-inversely related, but irreconcilable in the
context of capital punishment. Any statute or procedure that could
effectively eliminate arbitrariness from the administration of death would
also restrict the sentencer's discretion to such an extent that the sentencer
would be unable to give full consideration to the unique characteristics of
each defendant and the circumstances of the offense. By the same token,
grounds that it gave 'disproportionate significance to the enumeration of aggravating circumstances' has
become the constitutionally approved law of the land." Id. at 402 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6
commentary at 71-72 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
81. Givelber notes that "[w]ith the exception of the 'heinousness' circumstance, none of them
requires the jury to evaluate what the defendant did. Jurors simply need to find that she did it." Id. at
394 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
82. Givelber reports, for instance, that making felony murderers death-eligible whether or not their
killings were planned, intended, or accidental, greatly increases the ranks of African-Americans
convicted of killing whites among the death-eligible. He reports that bet%,een 1976 and 1989, 4% of
non-felony murders, as compared to 18% of felony murders, and 27.4% of robbery/felony murders,
involved African-American defendants and white victims. Id. at 417.
Givelber then goes on to state:
Because felony murder is the quintessential aggravated homicide and because it is also the
murder most likely to involve African American perpetrators and white victims, the prominence
of white victims in capital cases is not surprising. Indeed, the law of aggravating circumstances
encourages applying the death sentence to those who kill whites.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. In this connection, Givelber concludes,
The new law emphasizes behavioral as opposed to psychological criteria for imposing
death. This emphasis defeats any effort to articulate a theory of why it is appropriate to kill
some murderers and not others. To the extent that a unifying theme exists, it appears to be that
society renders subject to execution those whose conduct proves most frightening to the
potential sentencers. This criterion invites rather than diminishes the very subjectivity and
inconsistency which plagued the earlier law. Moreover, this test-translated into specific
aggravating circumstances-virtually assures that the race of the victim will be a powerful and
prominent determinant of who is prosecuted, convicted, and executed. Felony murder no longer
stands as an exception to the general rule of criminal responsibility based on conscious choice
to take life. Now, it is the paradigm of such responsibility, the worst crime in our lexicon.
Id. at 420 (footnote omitted).
84. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying cert.
to 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993).
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any statute or procedure that would provide the sentencer with sufficient
discretion to consider fully and act upon the unique circumstances of each
defendant would "thro[w] open the back door to arbitrary and irrational
sentencing." All efforts to strike an appropriate balance between these
conflicting constitutional commands are futile because there is a heightened
need for both in the administration of death."
Justice Blackmun faulted the Court for the character of its retreat from the
challenge.
In apparent frustration over its inability to strike an appropriate balance
between the Furman promise of consistency and the Lockett requirement
of individualized sentencing, the Court has retreated from the field,
allowing relevant mitigating evidence to be discarded, vague aggravating
circumstances to be employed, and providing no indication that the problem
of race in the administration of death will ever be addressed. 6
D. Outcomes-Based Assessment of the Remedies
The Supreme Court's endorsement of guided discretion statutes in Gregg,
Proffitt, and Jurek provoked empirical challenges as well as doubts and
criticisms. In response to the Court's conclusion in Gregg that "on their face
... [guided discretion capital statutes] seem to satisfy the concerns of
Furman,"87 came a succession of increasingly refined and rigorous empirical
studies of the application of these statutes. Some studies examined the overall
or cumulative processing of homicide cases from the occurrence of the crime
through the sentence imposed and/or appellate review."5 Other studies
focused on one or more discrete stages in the handling of such cases.8 9
85. Id. at 1136 (second alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 912
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
86. Id. at 1136-37.
87. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
88. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989) [hereinafter GROSS & MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION]; Bowers
& Pierce, supra note 79; Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured Discretion, Racial Bias and the Death
Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in Texas, 69 Soc. ScI. Q. 853 (1988); Samuel R. Gross &
Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide
Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discrimination in
Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 279 (1987).
89. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS El AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY];
BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987); David
C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A
Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The
Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS
L. REV. 27 (1988); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under
Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983); Raymond Paternoster,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimina-
tion, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 437 (1984); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime:
The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754
(1983); Michael L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM.
SOC. REV. 918 (1981); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587 (1985); Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart,
Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
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Virtually all of these studies revealed sizable and statistically significant
disparities in sentencing outcomes by the race of the victim.9" Some studies
found sentencing disparities based on the race of the defendant, although these
findings were less consistent or substantial than those pertaining to the race
of the victim.9 ' Most of the studies that examined sentencing outcome by
location within a particular state also found sizable and significant regional
disparities within states.
92
The most rigorous and exhaustive of these investigations, known as the
Baldus study,93 examined the effects of some 400 factors that might have
influenced the sentencing outcomes of more than 2400 persons arrested for
criminal homicide in Georgia between 1973 and 1978. 94 The Baldus study
found that in otherwise comparable cases, the death sentence was 4.3 times
more likely to be imposed upon convicted murderers whose victims were
white than on those whose victims were black.95 This evidence of victim-
based racial disparity in sentencing outcomes was presented to the Supreme
Court on behalf of petitioner Warren McCleskey.96
The research prompted judicial vacillation at successive stages of
McCleskey's appeal. The federal district court rejected the findings of the
Baldus study on the ground that the data and statistical analysis were
faulty.97 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit assumed the validity
Soc. CHANGE 743 (1990-1991); Jonathan R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in
Missouri: Examining the Issue of Racial Disparity, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCi. & LAw 61 (1995); Gennarof
F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Factors Influencing
Decision Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 79 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483 (1988).
90. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 89; GROSS
& MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 88; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 79.
91. See, e.g., BALDUS Er AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 89; GROSS
& MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 88; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 79.
92. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 89, at 40-79
(reporting on disparities in Georgia); Bowers & Pierce, supra note 79, at 601-07 (reporting disparities
between state judicial circuits in Georgia and Florida); Paternoster, supra note 89, at 778-83 (reporting
a disparity between urban and rural areas of South Carolina).
93. The Baldus study was acclaimed as "'far and away the most complete and thorough analysis
of sentencing."' McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (quoting Dr. Richard Berk,
a member of the Federal Sentencing Commission), affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Baldus study
received the Law and Society Association's prestigious Kalven Award. The study is fully reported in
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 89.
94. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 89, at 1-3. Among the
factors included in the study were the race of the defendant and the race of the victim, the age of the
defendant and the age of the victim, the defendant's role as a leader in the offense, whether there were
multiple victims, the commission of additional crimes after the murder, geographic factors, whether the
defendant resisted arrest, and whether the defendant had any prior convictions at the time of the murder
conviction. Id. at 140-85.
95. Id. at 143.
96. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). McCleskey was a black man convicted of the
murder of a white police officer during the armed robbery of a furniture store. Id. at 283.
97. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984). In rejecting this evidence, the
district court stated:
A persistent race of the victim effect is reported in the state-wide data on the basis of
experiments performed utilizing models which do not adequately account for other neutral
variables. These tables demonstrate nothing.... [T]here is no statistically significant evidence
produced by a reasonably comprehensive model that prosecutors are seeking the death penalty
or juries are imposing the death penalty because the defendant is black or the victim is white.
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of the racial disparities found by Baldus and acknowledged these disparities
to be "systematic and substantial," but held that they were not pronounced
enough to render Georgia's death penalty statute unconstitutional.98 The
Supreme Court itself sidestepped the troubling questions raised by the
scientific evidence99 and ruled by a narrow 5-4 margin that McCleskey must
show that jurors or other decision-makers intended to discriminate in his
particular case in order to prevail.'00
The majority opinion drew ardent dissents from Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall, each of whom declared that the majority
had misinterpreted the Baldus findings and misapplied Eighth Amendment
doctrine.' Justice Brennan, in particular, wrote that the Baldus study
Further, the petitioner concedes that his study is incapable of demonstrating that he,
specifically, was singled out for the death penalty because of the race of either himself or his
victim. Further, his experts have testified that neither racial variable preponderates in the
decision-making and, in the final analysis, that the seeking or the imposition of the death
penalty depends on the presence of neutral aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 379-80.
98. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 895 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
99. In a footnote, the Court explained:
Although the District Court rejected the findings of the Baldus study as flawed, the Court
of Appeals assumed that the study is valid and reached the constitutional issues. Accordingly,
those issues are before us. As did the Court of Appeals, we assume the study is valid
statistically without reviewing the factual findings of the District Court. Our assumption that
the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include the assumption that the study shows that
racial considerations actually enter into any sentencing decisions in Georgia. Even a
sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the Baldus study can only demonstrate a risk
that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser
risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 n.7 (emphasis in original). The Court also stated:
At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race.
Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. The
discrepancy indicated by the Baldus study is "a far cry from the major systemic defects
identified in Furman." As this Court has recognized, any mode for determining guilt or
punishment "has its weaknesses and the potential for misuse." Specifically, "there can be 'no
perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose
death."' Despite these imperfections, our consistent rule has been that constitutional guarantees
are met when "the mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with
safeguards to make it as fair as possible." Where the discretion that is fundamental to our
criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In
light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value
of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal
defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant
risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.
Id. at 312-13 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
100. Specifically, the Court stated:
[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers
in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no evidence specific to his own case
that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence. Instead,
he relies solely on the Baldus study.
Id. at 292-93 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Regarding guided discretion statutes, the Court declared, "[W]hile some jury discretion still exists,
the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce
nondiscriminatory application." Id. at 302-03.
101. All four of the dissenting Justices were quite convinced by the Baldus analysis of sentencing
outcomes. Indeed, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens based their dissents chiefly on the
implications of Baldus' empirical research. And Justice Blackmun's recent conclusion that capital
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unmistakably showed an intolerable risk of racial bias in capital sentencing,
and that the Eighth Amendment protects defendants against such an arbitrary
and irrational system, in part precisely because of "the difficulty of divining
the jury's motivation in an individual case." ' 2
E. The Court's Affirmation of a Process-Based Assessment
In McCleskey, the Court focused on the process by which capital jurors make
decisions rather than the outcomes of their decisions. The majority affirmed
its belief in the integrity of jurors' capital sentencing decisions and denied
that the Baldus analysis of sentencing outcomes impeached the exercise of
sentencing discretion by capital jurors in Georgia:
The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their
collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal
defendant. It is not surprising that such collective judgments often are
difficult to explain. But the inherent lack of predictability of jury decisions
does not justify their condemnation. On the contrary, it is the jury's
function to make the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy
codification and that "buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal
system."'
103
The Court made it clear one year earlier that it was concerned with the
decision-making of "real" rather than "mock" jurors. In Lockhart v.
McCree,' '4 the Court rejected an empirically based Sixth Amendment claim
that "death qualification" jury selection procedures-which eliminate
punishment in the post-Furman era is "a failed experiment" is grounded in the empirically demonstrated
arbitrariness of its application. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127: 1130 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 998 F.2d 269 (1993).
102. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also stated:
[Tihe Court's observation that McCleskey cannot prove the influence of race on any particular
sentencing decision is irrelevant in evaluating his Eighth Amendment claim. Since Furman v.
Georgia, the Court has been concerned with the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence,
rather than the proven fact of one. Furman held that the death penalty "may not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner."
Id. at 322 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427
(1980)). Brennan went on to note: "Once we can identify a pattern of arbitrary sentencing outcomes,
we can say that a defendant runs a risk of being sentenced arbitrarily. It is thus immaterial whether the
operation of an impermissible influence such as race is intentional." Id. n.1.
Brennan continued:
Defendants challenging their death sentences thus never have had to prove that
impermissible considerations have actually infected sentencing decisions. We have required
instead that they establish that the system under which they were sentenced posed a significant
risk of such an occurrence. McCleskey's claim does differ, however, in one respect from these
earlier cases: it is the first to base a challenge not on speculation about how a system might
operate, but on empirical documentation of how it does operate.
Close analysis of the Baldus study ... reveals that the risk that race influenced
MeCleskey's sentence is intolerable by any imaginable standard.
Id. at 324-25 (emphases in original).
103. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311 (citations omitted) (quoting HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 498 (1966)).
104. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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prospective jurors who are opposed to capital punishment-tend to bias juries
toward a sentence of death." 5 The petitioner relied upon some fifteen
studies that examined the process and effects of death qualification. 0 6 These
studies found that death-qualified jurors are disproportionately police-,
prosecution-, and conviction-prone; that they favor crime control over due
process values; and that death qualification questioning itself leads prospective
capital jurors to believe that death would be the appropriate sentence. 1 7
In light of this evidence, the federal district court ° and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit0 9 held that death-qualified juries were
unconstitutionally biased against the defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, rejected the evidence of jury bias owing to death qualification
procedures" 0 and reversed the holdings of the lower courts. The Court went
105. "Death qualifying" a jury is the removal for cause of any prospective juror whose views
regarding the death penalty "'would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)
(quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
106. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 169-70 nn.4-6 (citing, among others, HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON
JUROR ATTITUDES TowARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968); Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction
Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado
Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification
on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 53
(1984); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 121 (1984); Faye Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital-Scruples, Jury Bias,
and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53
(1970); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt
Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1970); William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty
Attitudes and Conviction Proneness, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984)). For evidence that the death
qualification standard established in Wilt fails to remove these biases, see Michael L. Neises & Ronald
C. Dillehay, Death Qualification and Conviction Proneness: Witt and Witherspoon Compared, 5
BEHAv. Sci. & L. 479 (1987).
107. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1291-1304 (1983) (describing the district court's
interpretation of the studies and their findings), aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 (1985) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
108. See id. at 1324 ("I[T]his court has found and concluded that, through the death qualification
practices permitted by the State of Arkansas in the guilt-determination phase of capital trials, petitioners
were denied their right to a neutral jury and to a representative jury.').
109. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 229 ("Based on the overall exhaustive record, we find ... substantial
evidence supports the court's finding that a capital jury, with ["Witherspoon excludables"] stricken for
cause, is in fact conviction prone and, therefore, [constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation].').
110. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168-73 (noting that the majority of the studies were, at best, "marginally
relevant" to the constitutionality of McCree's conviction; that of the remaining studies, several were
"insufficient" to make out a claim; and that several were not based on data gathered from jurors in
actual capital cases and, thus, the studies provided doubtful support). The dissenters in Lockhart also
read the empirical evidence of the biasing effects of death qualification procedures quite differently. See
id. at 189-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The evidence thus confirms [the bias of death-qualified jurors],
and is itself corroborated by, the more intuitive judgments of scholars and of so many of the participants
in capital trials .... "). For a social science perspective on the empirical evidence ofjury selection, and
particularly on the Court's treatment and critique of the evidence regarding death-qualified juries, see
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical Research on
Capital Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES
177 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988). See also Rogers Elliott, Social Science Data and
the APA: The Lockhart Brief as a Case in Point, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 59 (1991) (criticizing the
evidence upon which the American Psychological Association based its assertions in its amicus brief
in Lockhart); Rogers Elliott & Robert J. Robinson, Death Penalty Attitudes and the Tendency to Convict
or Acquit, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 389 (1991) (discussing three studies dealing with the effect ofjuror
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on to affirm its faith in the decision-making of real jurors in actual cases
involving real defendants. The trouble with the empirical studies, the Court
complained, was that the study participants "were not actual jurors sworn
under oath to apply the law to the facts of an actual case involving the fate
of an actual capital defendant. [The Court has] serious doubts about the value
of these [mock jury] studies in predicting the behavior of actual jurors."'
Thus, in both MeCleskey and Lockhart, the Court looked to the decision-
making process, rather than to the outcomes of that process, to ascertain how
real capital jurors in actual cases exercise their sentencing discretion. In
McCleskey, the Court found that statistical patterns of sentencing outcomes
were no substitute for knowing how individual jurors focus their collective
judgment." 2 In Lockhart, the Court asserted that the behavior of mock
jurors is no substitute for knowing how real jurors will behave when deciding
actual cases." 3 These cases thus imply that it is necessary to look inside the
"black box" of jury decision-making to address the issue of arbitrariness in
capital sentencing-that knowing what comes out of the black box (sentencing
outcomes) is no substitute for knowing what goes on inside the box (senten-
cing decisions).
The Supreme Court's concern in McCleskey with how actual jurors in real
cases focus their collective judgment is an articulated indication of what the
Court regards as relevant to the assessment of arbitrariness in the exercise of
capital sentencing discretion. Indeed, the Court indicated in McCleskey that
the motives and reasoning of jurors would have been directly relevant to the
determination of arbitrariness." 4 The State might have rebutted Baldus'
findings with direct evidence from the MeCleskey jurors-but such evidence
was unavailable because jurors cannot be called to testify about their verdict
in court.
Yet, such courtroom testimony is not the only way, or even the best way,
to learn from jurors about the risk of arbitrariness under guided discretion
capital statutes. While such testimony might have been vital to McCleskey and
attitudes toward the death penalty on issues such as conviction or acquittal, changes in the threshold for
finding guilt, and the amount of evidence required to find guilt when death as compared with life
imprisonment was the potential sentence); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know or Wait for
Godot?, 15 LAw & HuM. BEtAV. 77, 78-79 (1991) (discussing then-Justice Rehnquist's "failure to
understand" the implications of the studies introduced by the petitioner in Lockhart).
I 1. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171. Faulting death qualification research for failing to study actual jurors
in real cases is a preemptive criticism since, by its nature, the death qualification process prevents the
"scrupled" subjects of interest from serving on actual juries in capital cases, absent mistake.
112. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987).
113. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171.
114. The Court stated:
Another important difference between the cases in which we have accepted statistics as
proof of discriminatory intent and this case is that, in the venire-selection and Title VII
contexts, the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical disparity.... Here, the
State has no practical opportunity to rebut the Baldus study. "[Clontrolling considerations of
... public policy" . . . dictate that jurors "cannot be called.., to testify to the motives and
influences that led to their verdict."
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296 (citations omitted). By recognizing that the state might have rebutted the
Baldus findings with direct evidence from McCleskeyjurors but for its inability to call them to testify,
the Court indicated that the jurors' motives and reasoning were relevant to the determination of
arbitrariness.
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others who have been executed, its accumulation would yield an unsystematic
patchwork of evidence selected for advocacy purposes. A better method of
learning about the risk of arbitrariness would be to select jurors at random in
large numbers from a diverse sample of cases tried under different types of
sentencing statutes; to interview them independent of the parties to the case
on which they served; and to ask them about their motives, their reasoning,
and the influences on their sentencing decisions under conditions of strict
confidentiality. This would yield systematic evidence of how jurors in real
cases actually make their life or death decisions under the various capital
sentencing systems now in effect. These are the objectives and methods of the
Capital Jury Project.
In summary, the capital jury is the focus of the Supreme Court's thinking
about how to cure the arbitrariness that led to the invalidation of pre-Furman
capital statutes. The Court-approved remedies were statutes intended to guide
jurors' exercise of sentencing discretion, but the Court did not strictly monitor
their enforcement. Critics have challenged the efficacy of guided discretion
statutes as a cure for this arbitrariness. In addition, research on racial
disparities in sentencing outcomes and on death qualification during jury
selection suggests that bias and arbitrariness remain, even under guided
discretion statutes. Yet, the Court is unwilling to acknowledge that the remedy
has failed without first seeing how actual jurors make their sentencing
decisions in real cases. This is what the CJP intends to do.
II. THE EXERCISE OF SENTENCING DISCRETION
To appreciate how arbitrariness might enter jurors' capital sentencing
decisions, it is necessary to look more closely at what the law says about how
such decisions should be made and what the social science research on
decision-making suggests about how jurors will actually make these decisions.
Part II turns first to the legal view and then to the social science evidence on
such decision-making. This Part concludes with a review of the limited but
provocative empirical evidence on how capital jurors actually make their life
or death decisions.
A. The Algebraic Model:
The Legal Ideal for the Sentencing Decision
Once the Supreme Court decided that the guided discretion capital statutes
of Florida, Georgia, and Texas would curb arbitrariness in capital sentencing,
it had, in effect, endorsed a more or less coherent legal theory or model of
capital sentencing. The legislatures of these states had drawn upon existing
assumptions about how jurors make the guilt decision and extended them, or
at least their logic, to the sentencing process. The lead of the American Law
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Institute's Model Penal Code in articulating such a sentencing decision model
was followed to some degree in most states.'
15
The result can be seen as a generic model in which jurors make findings of
fact with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors and then decide the
defendant's punishment by some more or less explicit weighing or balancing
of the one against the other. Such an "algebraic approach" to decision-making
emphasizes the determination of facts, the assignment of weights to these
facts, and the use of a combination strategy to arrive at a final judgment."16
In this model, individuals are assumed to follow an averaging strategy
(anchor-and-adjust) in which each fact plays a part in the ultimate decision.
Valerie Hans has observed that such
[a]n algebraic model of jury decision processes seems to reflect rather
closely the legal assumptions underlying guided discretion statutes and
penalty phase jury instructions. If jurors decide death in this manner, then
judicial instructions to evaluate and weigh aggravating and mitigating
evidence and to reach a summary judgment would refleci their natural
decision processes. The instructions would be comprehensible and perhaps
even effective in guiding juror discretion." 7
Of course, the legal assumption is narrower than the generic model; the law
assumes that there are limited types of legally relevant evidence to be
considered in the determination of punishment. Arbitrariness is present in the
sentencing process when legally relevant considerations are misunderstood,
mistakenly applied, or ignored due to vagueness, ambiguity, unnecessary
complexity, or improper instruction in the legal standards."' There is no
explicit recognition in the algebraic model of external influences or pressures,
or of the predispositions and capabilities jurors bring to the decision-making
task.
The algebraic formulation fits some capital statutes better than others. It
comes closest to the most common "balancing" statutes," 9 which list both
aggravating and mitigating factors and ask jurors to weigh one against the
other when making their punishment decision. The "threshold"'12 and
"directed"'' statutes stretch the algebraic formulation. They may be
interpreted as special cases of this model that identify death-eligible
115. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980); see also id. cmts. 5, 6.
116. See generally NORMAN H. ANDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMATION INTEGRATION THEORY
(1981); Hillel J. Einhom & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference;
92 PSYCHOL. REv. 433 (1985).
117. Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE APPROACHES, supra note 110, at 149, 161.
118. For a discussion of how business organizations and other professionals have adopted analogous
approaches to decision-making to enhance the reliability of their decisions, see generally JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds.,
1986). Typically, however, the same decision-makers employ such a model over multiple, successive
decisions. Hans has noted that the situation is quite different when the decision-maker is a capital
jury-a group, rather than an individual, without prior experience in such decision-making, that is
charged with making a single, very high-stakes decision. Hans, supra note 117, at 151-53.
119. See supra notes 26-27, 39-47 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 24, 37-38 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 28-29, 36 and accompanying text.
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defendants by a single finding of statutory aggravation-at the guilt stage of
the trial under a directed or other narrowing statute, and during the sentencing
stage of the trial under threshold statutes. For those found death-eligible, the
jury then conducts a kind of factfinding and weighing of the evidence to
arrive at the appropriate punishment, though in different ways under the
different types of statutes.
For example, under Georgia's threshold statute, there are no enumerated
mitigating factors and no mention of methods or procedures for weighing."'
Indeed, the statute contains no explicit statement that weighing is required,
only the indication that the jury's sentencing decision should be informed by
considerations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.'2 3 Under Texas'
directed statute the sentencing decision is explicitly dictated by a factfinding
procedure in which the evaluation of the death-eligible defendant's future
dangerousness is the critical element. 24 The statute calls for the consider-
ation of mitigating factors, but any weighing of aggravation or mitigation is
left unexplicated.
Whatever protection from arbitrariness the algebraic decision process might
provide under the various statutory forms of guided discretion, it may not
accurately reflect the way in which most jurors make their sentencing
decisions. One reason lies in subsequent Supreme Court rulings about the
exercise of sentencing discretion. Another lies in what psychological research
shows about how jurors make their decisions. The discussion now turns to
these points.
B. The Court's Deregulation of the Capital
Sentencing Decision
The algebraic formulation as a model for capital se.ntencing did not survive
in any strict sense as a constitutional requirement. It was undermined as the
official understanding of how the sentencing decisions should be made, by the
series of Supreme Court decisions which Robert Weisberg characterized as
"deregulating death.' 25 The Court first exempted mitigating considerations
from the algebraic formula in Lockett v. Ohio,"6 and extended that exemp-
tion to aggravating circumstances in Zant v. Stephens.'
Drawing upon the Woodson "death is different" doctrine that requires
"individualized treatment" in sentencing, a plurality of Justices in Lockett
agreed that jurors must be able to consider "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
122. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990); see also supra note 24.
123. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30.
124. See TEx. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2; see also supra notes 28-29.
125. See Weisberg, supra note 48.
126. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
127. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"' 28 and that they
must give independent weight to such mitigation in the decision process. 29
In essence, the Lockett decision established that the capital sentencing task is
a unique moral decision different in kind from the factfinding of the guilt
determination. 30 As Goodpaster has expressed: "At the penalty phase of a
capital case, the central issue is no longer a factual inquiry into whether the
defendant committed any crimes; it is the highly-charged moral and emotional
issue of whether the defendant, notwithstanding his crimes, is a person who
should continue to live.''3
Notably, while Lockett affirmed the character of the sentencing decision as
a profound moral judgment rather than a factfinding task, the Court also held
in Lockett that the capital statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas already
permitted the unlimited consideration of mitigation, either because the
statutory language explicitly authorized it, or because the state appellate
courts had construed the law in this manner. 32
128. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. Chief Justice Burger, in his plurality opinion, went on to state:
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other
penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital
cases. The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due
the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.
Id. at 605.
129. Id. at 605. Burger reasoned that
a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating
weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense
proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk
is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id.
130. For interpretations of the Lockett ruling, see Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death
Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786, 799-802 (1983); Hans, supra note 117, at 149; Randy
Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital
Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317 (1981); Bruce
S. Ledewitz, The Requirement of Death: Mandatory Language in the Pennsylvania Death Penalty
Statute, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 103, 128-36 (1982); Weisberg, supra note 48, at 323-28.
131. Goodpaster, supra note 75, at 334-35. An especially apt statement of the difference between a
decision based on proof and one based on judgment is to be found in the words of Utah Supreme Court
Justice Stewart:
Whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances cannot be determined
by the same mental processes by which direct and circumstantial evidence are evaluated for
determining such questions as who entered an intersection first. The process of weighing and
evaluating evidence to determine the existence of a factual proposition is a process common
to the ordinary activities of life. The reference points are facts and inferences from facts; the
process is one of logic and practical experience. The point of evaluating aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in a capital case is not to prove a factual proposition but to determine
a punishment. ... The youth of the defendant, or the lack of prior criminal activity, cannot be
"weighed" in any meaningful sense against the aggravating facts. How does one find that the
"fact" that the age of the defendant, whether 18 or 30 years, does or does not preponderate
against an aggravating circumstance? ... To speak of weighing those factors against the
aggravating circumstances is to employ an appealing but meaningless metaphor which in fact
gives the mind no guidance in resolution of such an overwhelmingly important question.
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 275 (Utah 1980) (Stewart, J., concurring).
132. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606-07. For a further discussion of the role of mitigating circumstances and
the Supreme Court's ambivalence toward them, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling
Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. RaV. 1147 (1991).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Jurors making the penalty decision must reconcile or combine the facts of
the crime and perhaps other past crimes (the aggravation) with the meaning
of the "life story" of the defendant (the mitigation). These are not two
different versions of the same events; they are two different ways of
understanding human conduct, two different causal models. 3 3 The penalty
decision requires jurors "to 'equate incommensurables. ' ' '" 34 It is a decision
"involving judgment rather than proof.' 35 Reconciling, or choosing
between, two different causal explanations is a "meta-task" far beyond the
complexity of the ordinary factfinding decision. And legal scholarship
suggests that juries' difficulties in handling penalty phase evidence may fall
disproportionately on the side of mitigation. Factors such as sympathy and
mercy may be more difficult for jurors to articulate than aggravating
factors. 1
36
In Zant, the Court further liberated the sentencing decision from the
algebraic imperative, and from reviewability. It affirmed the unbridled
character of the sentencing decision once a single statutory aggravator had
served to identify a defendant as death-eligible. 37 It gave the prosecution
access to nonstatutory aggravators-unless state law provided otherwise.'38
Weisberg observed that Zant "essentially grant[ed] the states a Lockett right:
the penalty trial is to be a free market in information. The Court will permit
the state to introduce virtually any evidence in aggravation, without the
constraint of legal categories." 39 This, of course, placed departures from
133. Sontag has employed Mark Kelman's distinction between intentional and determinist prerational
assumptions to distinguish between the underlying logic of aggravation- and mitigation-based arguments
and reasoning. See Sontag, supra note 71, at 75; see also Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981). The aggravation-based argument rests
firmly on the traditional intentional model of conduct. See id. at 597-98. That is, it assumes that the
crime was the result of the defendant's free choice. In this model, punishment depends upon the link
between choice and blame; people should be punished when they choose to do evil. In the context of
such a model, mitigation pertaining to aspects of the defendant's life other than the crime itself would
be meaningless. With the introduction of mitigating evidence, the penalty trial "becomes the depository
of all the determinist explanations of the defendant's behavior which lie outside the normal [legal] rules
of insanity, diminished capacity, or provocation." Weisberg, supra note 48, at 324 n.80.
134. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 22, at 501 (quoting RUPERT CROSS & ANDREW ASHWORTH,
THE ENGLISH SENTENCING SYSTEM 132 (1981)).
135. Ledewitz, supra note 130, at 155 n.268.
136. Id. at 152-56.
137. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-78 (1982).
138. Id. at 878-79. The Court explained:
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally
necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other
possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants
who will actually be sentenced to death. What is important at the selection stage is an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime.
Id. (footnote omitted). A state is, of course, free to decide as a matter of state law to limit the evidence
of aggravating factors that the prosecution may offer at the sentencing hearing. A number of states do
not permit the sentencer to consider aggravating circumstances other than those enumerated in the
statute. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-6-602(4) (Michie 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(a)(2)
(1982); see also Gillers, supra note 23, at 101-19 (summarizing the provisions of capital punishment
laws in 35 states).
139. Weisberg, supra note 48, at 358.
1066 [Vol. 70:1043
1995] Cjp RATIONALE, DESIGN, & PREVIEW OF EARLY FINDINGS 1067
algebraic decision-making beyond constitutional scrutiny, and made it more
difficult to police arbitrariness.14
States with balancing statutes could continue under state law to have a sort
of algebraic-like weighing process for the exercise of sentencing discretion.
Aggravating considerations may be specified and limited by state law,
mitigating considerations may be specified but not limited by state law, and
state law may require jurors to weigh aggravating and mitigating consider-
ations. In some states, such as North Carolina, this process is made quite
concrete by providing jurors with a verdict form that lists the statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors (with space for nonenumerated mitigators)
that they must weigh in making their punishment decision.'4 '
There is an evident tension between the language of factfinding and
weighing in many state statutes, and the premium on individualized treat-
ment-free of statutory strictures-in the Court's "deregulating" decisions in
Lockett and Zant. Indeed, the Court's decisions have affirmatively forsaken
any model or legal formulation as to how the decision should be made.'
14 2
Only a few protections are constitutionally required:
The law must somehow identify a class of death-eligible murderers smaller
than the class of all murderers, must give some sentencer some discretion
about choosing which of the eligibles to execute, and must grant defendants
a fairly broad opportunity to make a case for mitigation. Beyond that, the
140. Sontag has observed, "[O]nce absolute discretion was re-introduced (if only by judicial
construction) into the hypothetical second stage ofjuries' penalty decision-making process, the content
of that decision became so mysterious and unformed that most errors could be viewed as harmless by
the reviewing courts." Sontag, supra note 71, at 64.
The Court in California v. Boyde asserted that if there is ambiguity as to the correct interpretation
of a penalty phase instruction, the "commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all
that has taken place at the trial [is] likely to prevail." 494 U.S. 370, 381 (1990). The standard for
analyzing a challenged instruction on review was reduced from the Sandstrom question-whether a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction in an unconstitutional manner, see Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1976)-to an inquiry as to "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitu-
tionally relevant evidence." Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380.
141. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b), (e), (f) (1994).
142. This point is clearest in passages where the Court contrasts the nature of the guilt and
punishment decisions for purposes of denying claims that the defendant's death sentence was imposed
arbitrarily.
If one of the few theories of guilt presented to the jury in the trial judge's instructions, or the
indictment, proves invalid, there is a substantial risk that the jury may have based its verdict
on an improper theory. This follows from the necessarily limited number of theories presented
to the jury, and from the fact that the jury's decisionmaking is carefully routed along paths
specifically set out in the instructions. When an aggravating circumstance proves invalid,
however, the effect ordinarily is only to diminish the probative value of one of literally
countless factors that the jury considered. The inference that this diminution would alter the
result reached by the jury is all but nonexistent.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900-01 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Or, similarly:
In returning a conviction, the jury must satisfy itself that the necessary elements of the
particular crime have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In fixing a penalty, however,
there is no similar "central issue" from which the jury's attention may be diverted. Once the
jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible
for the death penalty ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine
whether death is the appropriate punishment. In this sense, the jury's choice between life and
death must be individualized.
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rule may be of any kind, and the Court will not monitor its enforce-
ment. 1
43
C. The Psychological Realities of the Guilt Decision
The legal formulation of guilt determination has always been understood as
an ideal or normative description of how jurors should decide cases, not
necessarily a description of what they really do. 144 Psychological research
on how jurors actually determine a defendant's guilt has begun to map out
how jurors organize and process information in reaching their decisions. This
has led to the formulation and testing of an alternate guilt decision model: the
"narrative" or "story" model.
The story model of juror decision-making, advanced by Bennett and
Feldman'45 and elaborated principally by Pennington and Hastie,"46 argues
that jurors evaluate the guilt of the accused by arranging trial evidence in a
sequence of motivated events:
[P]eople transform the evidence introduced in trials into stories about the
alleged criminal activities. The structural features of stories make it
possible to perform various tests and comparisons that correspond to the
official legal criteria for evaluating evidence (objectivity, reasonable doubt,
and so on). The resulting interpretation of the action in a story can be
judged according to the law that applies to the case. 41
The research by Pennington, Penrod, and Hastie indicates that the story is
then compared to the available guilt verdict categories, with the jurors
choosing the category which best fits the story. They observed that as the
story of the crime develops in jurors' minds, they become increasingly
resistant to evidence that would cause them to reconstruct it.
4 1
This observation implies that in a capital case, the jurors will begin the
penalty phase with a story already constructed during the guilt phase of the
trial. The story therefore incorporates the important elements upon which the
jurors based their guilty verdict. New elements in the penalty phase would
143. Weisberg, supra note 48, at 358.
144. For example, difficulties with the legal assumptions regarding proof of the several elements of
a crime "beyond a reasonable doubt" have been identified by Jonathan Cohen and Ronald Allen, who
argue that the factfinding formula is unrealistic modeling of what jurors can be expected to do. See
Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 373 (1991); L. Jonathan Cohen,
The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1986).
145. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM (1981).
146. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991)
[hereinafter Pennington and Hastie, The Story Model]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence
Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on
Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 521 (1988).
147. BENNETr & FELDMAN, supra note 145, at 4.
148. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 146, at 169 ("[O]nce jurors' constructions of the evidence, their
stories of what happened, were formed and stabilized, these stories were relatively resistant to persuasive
argumentation from other jurors.").
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include the evidence of aggravation and mitigation that is adduced by the
prosecution and the defense. Since stories-once developed-are resistant to
reconstruction, jurors may thereafter be unreceptive to new penalty phase
evidence intended to create a different understanding that would serve as the
basis for deciding on punishment. Hence, sentencing deliberations and the
ultimate sentencing decision may often be dominated by the story of the crime
and the defendant that was developed during the guilt phase of the trial.
In contrast to the algebraic model that draws upon legalistic assumptions
about the weighing of evidence, the story model rests on psychological
assumptions about the way people make sense of complex and conflicting
information. As such, it provides a broader framework for understanding how
and why arbitrariness may enter the sentencing decision. It presupposes
psychological mechanisms such as simplification, dissonance reduction,
stereotyping, and consonance amplification. The individual is presumed to
approach decisions with predispositions and to evaluate evidence with
selectivity.'49 The "story" behind a given juror's decision is thus bound to
reflect subjective predispositions and internal consistencies. Indeed, a "strain
toward consistency" will tend to cause jurors to minimize the weight of
conflicting evidence and to overlook facts that do not "fit" the story. 50 By
implication, such a strain toward consistency might make a juror who has
developed a relatively firm guilt-phase story of the defendant unreceptive to
a defendant's subsequent expressions of remorse or other evidence of
mitigation in the penalty phase of the trial.1
5
'
D. The Matching Model: An Alternative View
of the Sentencing Decision
The Court's deregulation rulings and the psychological research on guilt
determination suggest that the algebraic formulation may not be an appro-
priate or accurate representation of how most jurors make sentencing
decisions. It seems especially unsuited given a shift in the decision-making
agenda from factfinding to moral reasoning that is supposed to encompass
both "proof" of aggravation and "judgment" about mitigation. Perhaps this
kind of complex moral decision-making, in which jurors must try to make
sense of a myriad of intentionalist and determinist considerations, also entails
working with the elements or the logic of stories; perhaps it involves
comparing and choosing among alternative stories.
149. Evidence for this view is summarized in DONALD E. VINSON, JURY TRIALS: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF WINNING STRATEGY § 4-3 (1986). See also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Betiveen Attitudes and
Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993) (reviewing how jurors' death-penalty-specific attitudes may influence their verdicts).
150. As an example, see Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of
a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013, 1049-55 (1991) (discussing how myths
and misconceptions about rape influence verdicts in rape trials).
151. Goodpaster, supra note 75, at 330.
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Valerie Hans has argued that jurors may choose among alternative
punishments by identifying or matching the crime and/or the defendant in the
case before them with more or less abstract "prototypes."'5 2 These proto-
types may be categorical (e.g., types of crimes or defendants, representing
perhaps an amalgamation of specific incidents or individuals), or particular
(e.g., a specific crime or criminal). She explains:
To decide whether a defendant deserves to die, jurors would match the
central figure in their story, the defendant, to the abstract prototype. If the
defendant is quite similar to the prototype, the match is close, and the juror
decides on death; if there are significant discrepancies, then the juror
decides on life.'53
During jury selection, attorneys occasionally ask prospective jurors whether
they have heard about a particular murder or murderer, and whether they
believe that someone guilty of such a crime deserves the death penalty. The
attorney may be probing for the prospective juror's internalized prototypes,
or indeed seeking to "fix" such a referent in the prospective juror's mind-to
plant a seed to be harvested in the punishment phase of the trial.
The matching model for punishment is similar to the story model for guilt
in that jurors are presumed to structure their thinking and process information
in terms of a story involving a crime or a murderer. But, instead of piecing
together a "causal" story of the crime from the evidence at the guilt stage of
the trial, jurors are presumed to draw upon prototypes for a "moral" story
involving a crime, a defendant, and the appropriate punishment in making
their decision at the sentencing phase of the trial. Hans observes:
If [attorneys'] penalty phase arguments reflect lawyers' intuitions about
how jurors decide death, then attorneys appear to believe that jurors
employ a category-based [matching] approach rather than afn algebraic]
weighing approach. If jurors do operate with such categories, then
instructions to weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence would be at odds
with their "natural" decision making strategy, and might be less successful
in governing their decisional processes." 4
The matching model, like the story model, can be interpreted to accommo-
date legal requirements. Jurors' moral or punishment stories will contain
elements of aggravation and mitigation consistent with life or death as
punishment. Jurors who match the crime and defendant before them with one
rather than another moral story may be seen as engaging in a sort of
"weighing" process. But the matching model also quite readily suggests how
"152. Hans, supra note 117, at 162. For this formulation, Hans draws upon Smith and Medin's
research in cognitive psychology. EDWARD F. SMITH & DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, CATEGORIES AND
CONCEPTS (1981). Unlike the story model, this categorical matching model is not the product of
empirical testing, reformulation, and retesting. Rather, it remains strictly hypothetical as a representation
of the sentencing process.
153. Hans, supra note 117, at 162.
154. lId There is no guarantee, of course, that jurors will wait for the punishment phase of the trial
to match the crime and/or defendant with a prototype or "moral" story that indicates the appropriate
punishment. And, the earlier that jurors decide what the defendant deserves, the more likely it is that
statutory sentencing standards will be discounted or ignored.
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arbitrariness and bias may enter the sentencing decision. The prototypes and
moral stories of clime and punishment that jurors employ can, of course, be
infected with misperceptions and misrepresentations. Imbedded in them, for
instance, may be distorted views of criminals, disparate feelings about crime
victims, or mistaken assumptions about alternative punishments.'55
E. Where the Sentencing Models Leave Off
The algebraic and matching sentencing decision models are hypothetically
posed, not empirically confirmed, accounts of how jurors make their
sentencing decisions. Neither may reliably describe how most jurors make
such decisions. Indeed, no single model, or small number of models, may
adequately map how sentencing decisions are made. This section considers
why jurors' decision-making might depart from these or other decision
models-a reason why jurors' decision-making may be quite idiosyncratic:
namely, the existential situation capital jurors face.
Capital jurors have good reason to feel uncertain and anxious about the
sentencing task. Sontag has aptly catalogued the elements of ambiguity capital
jurors confront:
The dislocation from the routines of everyday life, the unfamiliarity of
the sentencing task, the public exposure to which it subjects the jury, the
unsettling experience of learning about a frightening crime in minute and
graphic detail, the impact of finding another human being guilty of such a
crime, and then the necessity of switching "frames" of understanding from
one phase of the trial to the other, the incommensurable nature of the two
types of evidence that must be "weighed" in the penalty phase, the inherent
subjectivity and moral relativity of the penalty decision, and the burden of
choosing between life and death can all create ambiguity ... [and] can
leave the jury with uncertainties and anxiety about what they are supposed
to do. 56
Such ambiguity, uncertainty, and anxiety may be an invitation to whim and
arbitrariness, regardless of statutory guidelines.'57 Ambiguity about the
evidence, the task, or the rules that apply may cause jurors to be susceptible
155. For an indication of the biasing effect of mistaken assumptions regarding the punishment for
convicted first-degree murderers not sentenced to death, see Bowers, supra note 22, at 167-71 (drawing
upon data from the CJP to show that jurors who impose the death penalty, as compared to those who
do not, more often and more substantially underestimate the time that first-degree murderers who are
not sentenced to death will serve in prison before being paroled or returned to society). For a legal
analysis of this issue, see Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror
Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 211 (1987), and William W. Hood, Note, The Meaning of "Life"for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect
on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1989). See also J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life
Without Parole? ". A Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 327 (1983).
156. Sontag, supra note 71, at 80.
157. Erving Goffman has observed that when action is required, and yet there are ambiguities
regarding what primary framework of understanding to apply, "ambiguity will be translated into felt
uncertainty and hesitancy." ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYsIs: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION
OF EXPERIENCE 302 (1974).
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to irrelevant or improper influences.' Uncertainty about how to proceed
may cause jurors to "invent" their own rules or understandings about how the
sentencing task should be performed. 5 9 Anxiety about the sentencing task
and insecurity about their performance may cause jurors to seek consensus
and approval over independence and objectivity in decision-making. 60
Furthermore, the discussion of decision models has been cast largely in
terms of the individual juror. The convicted defendant's punishment is, of
course, a collective or group decision. Any group decision may be an
amalgam of individual decisions arrived at quite differently. Regardless of
how the individual jurors approach the decision-making task, group processes
are also apt to be involved in reaching a final consensus about the defendant's
punishment. When the jurors are not of one mind at the start of sentencing
deliberations, the stage is set for what might be different kinds of group
processes.
Among the contrasting group decision processes documented in research on
guilt deliberations are "evidence-driven" and "verdict-driven" delibera-
tions. 6' As these terms suggest, in evidence-driven deliberations, the
premium is on reviewing the facts, interpreting the evidence, and addressing
differences of opinion by reference to the evidence. In verdict-driven
deliberations, the emphasis is on determining the verdict preference of most
jurors early on and then converting the minority to this view with whatever
arguments or influences may be effective.
158. Kalven and Zeisel concluded that ambiguous evidence opens the door to the influence of
unrecognized "sentiment" in jury decisions. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 103. Thompson, Cowan,
Ellsworth, and Harrington have argued that an attitude, such as racial prejudice,
is likely to have an unrecognized influence on behavior (1) when the attitude is associated with
a perspective (or set of scripts) that is applicable to the situation at hand; (2) when the situation
itself is sufficiently ambiguous to leave substantial room for differences in interpretation;
(3) when the behavioral alternatives are clear and the person cannot abstain from choosing
among them; and (4) when the criterion for choosing is not clearly specified.
William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of
Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 111 (1984) (footnote omitted). Concerning penalty
phase instructions, Hans has observed that "the admonition to disregard illegitimate factors is based on
two questionable premises: that jurors know when an illegitimate factor is influencing them, and that
they are able to subtract the influence of this factor in the decisional calculus." Hans, supra note 117,
at 163. She adds that "[t]he difficulty of instructing jurors to disregard illegitimate factors is magnified
in the penalty phase because the decision maker must be allowed to consider any relevant mitigating
evidence of the defendant's background and character and the circumstances of the offense." Id. at 164
(citations omitted).
159. Sontag cites Shibutani's research on the genesis of rumor in ambiguous situations for the
proposition that uncertainty "can lead penalty juries to substitute their own 'instructions,' that is, their
own rules," where there are "gaps in the jury instructions." Sontag, supra note 71, at 81. "'[P]reviously
accepted norms prove inadequate or inappropriate as guides for conduct if a situation becomes
problematic and some kind of emergency action is required."' Id. (quoting TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI,
IMPROVISED NEWS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RUMOR 172 (1966)).
160. Schachter has shown that anxiety and insecurity arouse affiliative needs and, more specifically,
a need for social evaluation. Assuming evaluative needs and granting a situation in which evaluation
is possible only through social comparison processes, it follows from the above that if discrepancies
exist among group members, pressures will arise to reduce such discrepancy. STANLEY SCHACHTER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFILIATION: EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF THE SOURCES OF GREGARIOUSNESS 104
(1959).
161. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 146, at 163-65 (1983).
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When it comes to the sentencing decision, there might be different types of
evidence-driven group decision processes-perhaps to the extent that group
norms develop supporting a weighing or matching approach to the punishment
decision. Thus, jurors may collectively decide to weigh elements of aggrava-
tion and mitigation in light of statutory guidelines, or to compare and contrast
the case at hand with prototypes of crimes and defendants to arrive at the
appropriate punishment. Alternatively, they may improvise distinctive rules
and procedures that mix various aspects of weighing, matching, and
moralizing. And there may be a verdict- or outcome-driven process in which
jurors attempt to break the resistance of dissenters or holdouts by means not
restricted to evidence-based weighing or matching procedures. For example,
in outcome-driven sentencing deliberations, persuasion might entail the
reduction of the complex moral decision to a single simplistic distinction or
formula specially tailored to the concerns of potential holdouts.
The foregoing discussion of the ways in which capital jurors and juries may
make their sentencing decisions points to the need for empirical research. This
Part concludes with a review of the limited but provocative available evidence
on jurors' exercise of capital sentencing discretion.
F. The Empirical Research on Capital Jurors'
Sentencing Decisions
Of the countless studies of jurors and juries since Kalven and Zeisel's 1966
classic, The American Jury, only three quite recent efforts-one published
study 62 and two doctoral dissertations 63 (which were recently summarized
in published form16 4)-have attempted systematically to examine how jurors
make sentencing decisions in capital cases. In each of these studies, the
investigators interviewed at least three jurors each from nine or ten capital
trials in a particular state.
In the first of these studies, William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam
interviewed some 54 jurors from ten Florida trials-five in which the jury
voted for death and five in which it voted for life imprisonment. 61 In the
other two studies, Lorelei Sontag and Sally Costanzo, respectively, inter-
viewed 30 California and 27 Oregon capital jurors. In California, Sontag
interviewed jurors from one death and one life case in each of five counties
162. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 74.
163. Sally Costanzo, Penalty Decision-Making Under the Special Issues Framework: A Social
Psychological Analysis (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Santa Cruz),
reprinted by UMI Dissertation Services); Sontag, supra note 71.
164. Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the
Jurisprudence of Death, 50 J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 149.
165. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 7-10. The life cases studied by Geimer and Amsterdam
were atypical in that the authors purposely chose cases in which the jury had decided on a life sentence,
but the trial judge had rejected or overridden the jury's decision and imposed a death sentence (as
permitted under Florida's judicial override provision). Id. at 8-9.
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throughout the state. 66 In Oregon, Costanzo interviewed jurors in five death
and four life cases from a single urban county responsible for the majority of
Oregon's capital trials. 67 In all three of these studies, the questioning
protocol was largely open-ended, with only a few structured questions posed
to all jurors' 68
The Florida study examined jurors' exercise of sentencing discretion under
the first balancing statute to be upheld by the Supreme Court. 69 In that
study, Geimer and Amsterdam asked the jurors to explain the reasons for their
life or death sentencing decisions and to evaluate the role or influence of
Florida's statutory aggravating and mitigating considerations on their
decisions. A majority of the jurors interviewed (35 of 54) said that Florida's
statutory aggravating and mitigating guidelines had "little or no influence" on
their sentencing decisions. 70
Geimer and Amsterdam's analysis of jurors' primary reasons for the
punishment they imposed led the researchers to formulate what they called the
"operative factors" that were most important in deciding whether or not to
impose a death sentence, as opposed to the statutory factors that jurors said
were of little or no importance in the sentencing decision.'' The most
common operative aggravator (cited by 54 percent of the jurors in death-
recommendation cases) was a presumption of death as the appropriate
punishment as indicated by "the view that death was to be the punishment for
first degree murder, or at least that death was to be presumed appropriate
unless [the] defendant could persuade the jury otherwise."' 172 Sixty-nine
percent of the jurors interviewed in the life-recommendation cases cited
lingering doubt about guilt as indicated by "[t]he existence of some degree of
doubt about the guilt of the accused."'
' 73
Under California's balancing statute, 74 which lists "special circum-
stances" without specifying whether these factors are to be considered as
aggravating or mitigating, and without indicating how the factors are to be
166. See Sontag, supra note 71, at 90. In two of the cases Sontag studied, the original trial jury had
not reached a unanimous sentencing decision and the prosecution chose, as permitted under the
California statute, to retry the sentencing phase with a different jury that had not been exposed to the
guilt phase. Id. at 168.
167. Costanzo, supra note 163, at 44-45. In one of the death cases, two co-defendants who were tried
jointly were both sentenced to death. The jurors were interviewed about both sentencing decisions. Id.
at 45.
168. Sentencing verdicts in the California and Oregon cases were rendered between 1986 and 1989,
and the interviews were conducted between 1987 and 1989-on average within 10 months or less of
the trial. See Haney et al., supra note 164, at 155.
169. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); see also supra notes 2, 16, and accompanying text.
The Florida capital statute lists both aggravating and mitigating factors and requires that jurors weigh
aggravating against mitigating factors in reaching their sentencing decision. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(2). The Florida statute also permits the trial judge to reject or override the jury's sentencing
decision. Id. § 921.141(3).
170. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 24.
171. Id. at 26-28, 40-41.
172. Id. at 41.
173. Id. at 28.
174. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.1 (West 1988).
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weighed in making the punishment decision, juries seemed quite confused
about how to make the sentencing decision. Sontag found that California
juries deliberated with much broader and less coherent agendas, and took
approximately three times longer to reach a sentencing verdict than did the
Oregon juries studied by Costanzo.' 71
Many California jurors tended to search for a key factor that would make
the decision clear-cut. They typically narrowed the decision by focusing
almost exclusively on the crime and on issues which had already come up in
the guilt decision-making phase of the trial. The investigators reported that
"fully one-third of our sample refocused the penalty phase inquiry entirely on
the nature of the crime itself, and did so in a way that amounted to a
presumption in favor of death."'' 6 This tendency to boil the complex
question of life or death down to one dispositive point is illustrated in the
comments of a few jurors. For example, one death-juror recalled the nature
of the penalty decision as follows: "'[A]ccording to the instructions, the main
thing was, was it premeditated? Did he deliberately, did he intend to kill these
people? If so, then we should give him the death penalty. If not, then we
should give him life without the possibility of parole."""177 Another juror
confused the penalty decision with the legal standard of insanity: "'I think the
bottom line was, at the time he was committing [the crimes], did he know
what he was doing? Did he know right from wrong? That's the whole
thing.'1
78
Oregon's Texas-like directed statute 79 makes the defendant's life or death
sentence turn almost exclusively upon the jurors' answer to a single question:
"[w]hether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. '
Oregon juries, compared to those in California, appeared more coherent in
their decision-making but were much more constricted in the range of
information they considered.' The directed statutes used in Oregon and
Texas have been charged with discouraging the presentation and consideration
of mitigating evidence.'82 In this connection, Costanzo reported that
175. Haney et al., supra note 164, at 160-62.
176. Id. at 162 (emphasis in original).
177. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting a California juror).
178. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting a California juror).
179. See OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150 (1993).
180. Id. § 163.150(1)(b)(B). The Oregon statute at the time of Costanzo's study (and as it currently
exists), like the Texas statute approved in Jurek, also made the death sentence contingent on affirmative
answers to two additional questions: "Was the killing unreasonable in response to the provocation"? and
"Was it deliberate"? See id. § 163.150(l)(b)(A), (C). Yet, the guilt decision also requires affirmative
answers to the latter two questions. Thus, in principle, the issue of future dangerousness is the only open
question at the sentencing phase of the trial. As in Texas, jurors' answers have been interpreted to
incorporate a consideration of mitigation, although as in Texas, the Oregon statute was revised in 1989
to make it explicit that the answer to this question should take account of mitigation. See id.
§ 163.150(l)(b)(D), (c); see also State v. Wagner, 786 P.2d 93 (Or. 1990).
181. 'Haney et al., supra note 164, at 160; see also Costanzo, supra note 163, at 102-11.
182. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (overturning a death sentence imposed under the
Texas statute). In an earlier case challenging the Texas sentencing procedure, the Supreme Court
specifically acknowledged the possibility that in certain types of cases these questions might overlook
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although most jurors said there was nothing more they would like to have
heard about in deciding on the punishment, many of their comments
underscored the narrowing effect of the directed statute on the range of issues
they considered: "'We just had to stick to those four [sic] basic criteria. We
couldn't deviate with this mitigating circumstance, or testimony of people that
had spoken on his behalf or against him. We just had to go by those
guidelines that they give you when you make that decision.'0
1 8 3
Oregon jurors relied upon the sentencing instructions not only to narrow the
scope of the evidence they considered but also to minimize their responsibility
for the outcome of their deliberations:
"We are not sentencing him to death-we are just answering these
questions. We talked about it. 'We are just answering these questions'-to
get a clear mind so as not to feel guilty that I sentenced him to die. That's
how the law has it-just answer these questions." '84
Oregon jurors also generally underestimated how long convicted defendants
who were not given the death penalty would spend in prison before returning
to society, and fully one-half of the Oregon jurors did not believe that the
death penalty would actually be carried out.'85
Concerning both the California and Oregon studies, the investigators
observed that "there was a tendency among jurors from both samples to shift
or abdicate responsibility for the ultimate decision-to 'the law,' to the judge,
or to the legal instructions-rather than to grapple personally with the life and
death consequences of the verdicts they were called upon to render."8 " In
addition, the researchers concluded:
Capital penalty instructions fail to acknowledge (let alone clearly frame or
carefully guide) the inherently moral nature of the task that they direct
jurors to undertake. They seem to imply that death sentencing involves
nothing more than simple accounting, an adding up of the pluses and
minuses on the balance sheet of someone's life.8 7
These studies raise serious questions about the operation of the guided
discretion statutes in these states and point to the need for a more extensive
and more rigorous study of the exercise of capital discretion. The CJP seeks
to build upon this work, to develop more systematic and scientifically reliable
interview data on jury sentencing decisions, to see whether and in what ways
various elements of arbitrariness enter and affect these sentencing decisions,
and to assess the extent to which such arbitrariness is present under the
various Gregg-, Proffitt-, and Jurek-inspired statutory guidelines.
constitutionally required mitigation. But it concluded that a jury operating under the special issues
framework "[is] likely to weigh mitigating evidence as it formulates these answers to the-three questions
in a manner similar to that employed by capital juries in 'pure balancing states."' Franklin v. Lynaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 182 n.12 (1988).
183. Haney et al., supra note 164, at 165-66 (quoting an Oregon juror).
184. Id. at 166-67 (quoting an Oregon juror).
185. Id. at 170.
186. Id. at 160.
187. Id. at 172.
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III. THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT
A. General Objectives
The common effort of the CJP research team and the independent work of
the respective investigators is guided by the following three general
objectives:
1. To examine and systematically describe jurors' exercise of capital
sentencing discretion;
2. To identify the sources and assess the extent of arbitrariness in
jurors' exercise of capital discretion; and
3. To assess the efficacy of the principal forms of capital statutes in
controlling arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
B. Project Design and Organization
The Capital Jury Project is organized as a consortium of university-based
investigators specializing in the analysis of data collected in their respective
states and collaborating to address the objectives of the Project. For
comparison across states, the research is based on a common core of data
collected from the participating states. State-specific data are used to address
particular issues of interest in the respective states.
Lengthy, in-person interviews with capital jurors are the chief source of data
for this research. The investigators cooperatively developed a core juror
interview instrument. They enhanced the use of this instrument in their
respective states by adding to the information gathered in the core interviews,
conducting additional interviews in selected cases of special interest, and
incorporating additional case-specific data from other sources.
Advanced law and/or social science students working under the supervision
of the various faculty investigators carried out much of the interviewing and
other data collection in the respective states. All jurors selected for'interviews
are guaranteed confidentiality and offered twenty dollars as an incentive for
their participation. The preparation of the interview data for state-level and
project-wide analyses is being carried out at Northeastern University.
1. Sampling Plan
The study incorporates a three-stage sampling design. First, states
representing the principal variations in guided discretion capital statutes were
chosen. Then, within each state, full capital trials since 1988 with both guilt
and sentencing phases were selected in equal numbers to provide balanced
coverage of cases that resulted in life and death sentences. Finally, a
minimum of four randomly selected jurors from each case are being
interviewed.
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a. State Sample
The participating states were selected in order to represent the principal
types of, and distinctions among, guided discretion capital statutes.'8 8
Priority has been given to states with a sufficient volume of capital trials to
meet case sampling quotas' 89 and to states that would enhance the regional
diversification of the sample. University-based law and social science faculty
members with research interests in this area were identified and recruited to
serve as the chief investigators for the participating states.
The first eight participating states 90 were selected to provide coverage of
threshold, balancing, and directed statutes, and to include statutes with
narrow, as well as traditional, definitions of capital murder.'9 Four
additional states 92 were selected one year later to enhance statutory coverage
and representativeness.'93 Two additional states194 subsequently joined the
project with independent funding to cover the costs of data collection. As
indicated in Table 1 below, the fourteen states currently participating in the
CJP include states with threshold, balancing, and directed statutes; advisory
and binding sentencing variations of the balancing model; and narrow as well
as traditional statutory definitions of capital murder. 195
188. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
189. See infra part III.B.l.b.
190. The initial eight states that were the focus of the CJP were: California, Florida, Indiana,
Kentucky, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Pennsylvania was substituted for New
Jersey in the original eight-state sample shortly after the sampling began. In New Jersey, the investigator
for that state discovered that there had been only five death cases during the sample period---one-third
of the trial sample quota for such cases. See infra part III.B.1.b. New Jersey was reinstated in the CJP
in 1994 with independent support and a revised case sampling plan.
191. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (employing a "traditional" definition of capital murder
as requiring a finding of at least one of several enumerated aggravating factors during the sentencing
phase) with TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (defining capital murder "narrowly" by requiring the jury
at the guilt phase of the trial to find that the killing took place under at least one of eight aggravating
circumstances).
192. The next four states added to the CJP were Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
Prospective investigators in these states were initially contacted shortly after the CJP began as a hedge
against the possible loss of states in the original sample, and to enhance the coverage of balancing
statutes. These states were subsequently added to the CJP with supplemental funding from the National
Science Foundation.
193. More specifically, adding Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee enhanced the CP's
coverage of the most common forms of guided discretion statutes (i.e., balancing statutes under which
the jury's sentence is binding on the trial judge), and improved the regional representativeness of these
balancing statutes in the CJP.
194. Alabama and New Jersey were the last two states added to the CJP. When New Jersey rejoined
the CJP, the sample time frame and the initial case quota were set aside. Both of these states began with
twenty-trial and eighty-juror target samples.
195. See supra part I.A. See generally sources cited supra note 23.
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TABLE 1196
FORMS OF GUIDED DISCRETION
DEFINITION OF
CAPITAL BALANCING WITH
HOMICIDE THRESHOLD SENTENCING DIRECTED
ADVISORY BINDING
NARROW VA AL** CA, LA* TX
GA* NC*, NJ**
TRADITIONAL KY, SC FL, IN PA, TN*
In terms of geographical representation, there are Western, Southwestern,
Midwestern, Mid-Atlantic, Border, and a spread of Southern states included
in the sample. Sampling a relatively large number of states enhances both the
geographical diversity and statutory variation in the data which, in turn,
provides greater flexibility in exploring other statutory and procedural
differences among states (for example, differences in the statutory and non-
statutory aggravators that jurors may, must, or must not consider; differences
in the instructions or procedures jurors are asked to follow in deciding on the
sentence). Having a large sample of states also makes the findings less
sensitive to idiosyncratic state-specific influences. 97
b. Trial Samples
In each state, a sample of full capital murder trials that went through both
the guilt and punishment phases is drawn from all such trials conducted in
that state since January, 1988.198 For the original eight states, the target
sample is thirty trials-fifteen in which the jury voted for the death penalty,
196. The four states denoted by an asterisk (*) were added in the second year of the CJP. The two
states denoted by two asterisks (**) were added in the third and fourth years of the CJP.
197. A further advantage of having a relatively large number of participating states is the flexibility
it provides in adjusting to the possible failure to complete the data collection, or any other unforeseen
obstacles to the research in a given state. Thus, for example, interviews not completed in one state could
be proportionally reallocated to other states to preserve statutory and/or geographical representation.
198. At the time of sample selection in a few states, there had not been the requisite number of full
capital trials since January, 1988, in which life or death jury verdicts had been handed down. In these
instances, a few cases tried prior to the beginning of the sampling period were included in the samples.
For example, there were fewer than 15 death cases in Kentucky and fewer than 15 life cases in Virginia
at the time the case samples were drawn for these states. Thus, the current Kentucky sample includes
two pre-1988 trials, one of which occurred in 1986 and the other in 1987. See Maria Sandys, Cross-
Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing
Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1189 (1995). In Virginia, recent cases are being added to the sample in
order to meet the quota of 15 life cases. In both Kentucky and Virginia, consideration was given to
oversampling jurors from the underrepresented trials in order to reach the overall quota of juror
interviews. See supra part III.B.I.c.
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and fifteen in which it did not.'99 For the remaining six states, the target
sample is twenty trials-ten with death and ten with life imprisonment
verdicts. In selecting trials for the sample, investigators have generally
favored more recent cases on the assumption that the more recent the
experience, the more detailed and reliable will be the jurors' recall. Investiga-
tors have occasionally departed from this general rule, however, to enhance
the diversity of the sample,"0 the independence among case characteris-
tics,2 O' or the comparability of the life and d eath subsamples.0 2 In a few
instances, investigators have randomly sampled the full inventory of capital
trials, or the life and the death cases separately, since 1988.203
The sample of recent capital trials is drawn from all capital murder trials
occurring within a state, except in California, Florida, and Texas. In these
three states, which are characterized by long distances within state boundaries
and a large volume of capital trials, the sampling of capital trials was
restricted to a specific area within the state. In California, the cases come
from the middle one-third of the state bounded roughly by San Francisco,
Sacramento, and Fresno. In Florida, the cases come from the northern and
central portion of the state-the area north of Tampa including the Panhandle.
The Texas sample comes from the south-central quadrant-which includes
Austin, Houston, San Antonio, and rural counties within this area. The data
collection has been limited to these areas within the states in order to
conserve the time and expense of data collection. The number of cases within
these areas is sufficient for sampling purposes.0 4
199. In Florida and Indiana, where judges have the final sentencing authority and occasionally
override the jury's sentencing verdict, trials were sampled to achieve a balance between life and death
jury verdicts, rather than judge-imposed life or death sentences, since the focus of the CJP is on the
decisiofi-making of jurors rather than judges.
200. For example, if most capital trials in a given state take place in urban settings, those in rural
locations might be oversampled (with the likely effect that earlier cases are included) to facilitate the
analysis of differences in the decision-making of jurors in both rural and urban settings. Alternatively,
if such cases are less common in some regionally or culturally distinct areas of a state, trials from these
areas might be oversampled (again with the likely effect of including earlier cases) to provide sufficient
representation for analysis. For an example of such sampling, see Sandys, supra note 198, at 1189.
201. As an example, if most capital trials for felony-type murders are held in urban settings, the
sample of capital trials might overrepresent felony-type murder cases occurring in rural areas to increase
opportunities for comparing jurors from cases different in one respect (rural/urban setting), but alike in
another (felony-type murder). This would facilitate an examination of whether the thinking of jurors
about this particular type of crime is different in the two settings.
202. For example, this might entail selecting capital trials so as to match the distributions of life and
death subsamples in terms of several characteristics, such as region within the state, urban versus rural
setting, and type of offense (e.g., killings that were, and were not, committed in the course of another
felony). Alternatively, it might involve selecting life and death cases in "like pairs" where each pair of
cases is matched insofar as possible in respects other than sentencing outcome. This strategy of matching
pairs of life and death cases on independent variables would improve the chances of detecting factors
that influence the sentencing decision in otherwise quite similar cases. The "like-pairs" strategy was
employed in the sampling of cases in North Carolina. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 72.
203. For instance, random sampling within categories of city size was used to obtain the Florida
sample of capital trials. See Julie Goetz, The Decision Making of Capital Jurors in Florida: The Role
of Extra Legal Factors 91-92 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University
(Tallahasee)) (copy on file with author).
204. The representativeness of all sampled cases, and of the life and death subsamples, can be
assessed with information from an inventory of all capital trials held in the state (or in the target areas
within California, Florida, and Texas) since 1988. Such an inventory was prepared for sampling
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c. Juror Samples
CJP investigators attempt to interview four randomly selected jurors from
each trial. Thus, in states where the target sample is thirty trials, a total of
120 juror interviews are conducted, while eighty interviews are conducted in
those states with a twenty-trial sample. Investigators have conducted
additional interviews (above the four-per-case minimum) in trials of special
interest, particularly where the initial interviews left some questions
unanswered or raised further questions. Strict procedures are followed to
ensure randomness in the selection of jurors and to minimize selection bias
in replacing jurors who cannot be located or who do not agree to be inter-
viewed." 5 As noted above, jurors are assured that their responses will be
kept strictly confidential, and are provided with a twenty-dollar payment for
their participation.
The four randomly selected jurors per trial are not, of course, a sufficient
sample for generalizing about the experiences of all twelve jurors in a given
case. These four jurors can, however, be relied upon for "contextual" data,
especially on matters of fact (for example, the sequence of witnesses, or the
first ballot vote for and against a death sentence) where agreement can be the
gauge of reliability. Thus, while the chief focus is on the decision-making
behavior of the individual juror as the unit of analysis, the individual level
analysis can be enhanced with contextual information gained by aggregating
or "triangulating" the data from all four jurors in a case.
2. Data Collection
As previously noted, a common core of data from the participating states
is being collected in order to make comparisons across states, and state-
specific data is being gathered to address issues of particular interest within
states. While juror interviews are the principal source of data for our analyses,
trial transcripts and interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
are also being used by investigators for research purposes.
purposes by the investigator in each state. For each capital trial, the inventory included the sentencing
verdict, regional location, rural versus urban setting within the state, felony killings versus non-felony-
type killings, and race of the defendant and victim(s), insofar as such information could be obtained.
205. To obtain a representative sample of four jurors, the investigators adopted the following
systematic procedure for picking the initial four jurors and replacing any juror who could not be reached
or who refused to participate: (1) jurors were numbered from 1 to 12 corresponding to the order in
which they appeared on the jury list; (2) a starting point was picked at random, to obviate any bias that
might be associated with the method by which the jurors were listed (e.g., the foreperson was always
listed first or last); (3) from the starting point on the list, successive jurors (where #1 follows #12 in the
sequence) were assigned the following sample status designations: Al (starting point), BI (next juror),
CI (next), A2 (next), B2, C2, A3-C3, A4-C4 (last juror in the sequence); (4) Panel A jurors (designated
Al through A4) were the initial four-juror sample contacted for interviews. Up to five attempts were
made at different times of the day over a three-day period to contact a given juror in order to arrange
an interview; (5) any Panel A juror who did not participate was replaced with the corresponding Panel
B juror (if that failed after five attempts, the Panel A juror was replaced with the corresponding Panel
C juror). If both replacement efforts failed, the investigator continued by moving to the next Panel B
juror in the sequence, the corresponding Panel C juror, the next Panel B juror, and so on.
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a. Juror Interviews
The interviews with the sample jurors are designed to chronicle the jurors'
experiences and thinking over the course of the trial, to identify the points at
which various influences (including aspects of arbitrariness) may come into
play, and to reveal the ways in which jurors reach their sentencing decisions.
The interviews are conducted using a fifty-page instrument2 6 that was the
product of six revisions, two pretests, and two meetings of the participating
investigators. 0 7 Some twenty project memoranda were also circulated on
matters such as instrument development, pretesting procedures, interviewing
techniques, feedback on interviewing performance, and related matters.
Once the jurors in the sample have been identified by name and address, the
investigator sends them a letter describing the research, promising confiden-
tiality, offering the twenty-dollar payment, and asking for their participation,
if randomly chosen as one of the four jurors to be interviewed. An interviewer
follows up these letters with phone calls to schedule interviews with the four
randomly selected jurors, to arrange replacements for any of these four who
do not participate, and to inform the others that they were not chosen to be
interviewed. The interviews typically last at least three hours20 8 and are
206. The interview instrument is a mixture of both structured questions with designated response
options and open-ended questions that occasionally invite lengthy narrative descriptions of issues such
as the crime and the jury's sentencing deliberations. It contains many explicit interviewing instructions.
All questions and response options were read verbatim by the interviewer, and open-ended questions
were typically accompanied by instructions about areas or issues to be probed. To convey both the
general orientation of these interviews and to identify the types of problems and difficulties that some
interviewers have experienced, a 15-page Interviewers' Guide was prepared that emphasizes the
importance of encouraging respondents to take as much time as they need to relate everything they
regard as relevant. The investigators in the various states conducted training sessions for interviewers
that included a detailed review of the interview instrument and its embedded instructions, a thorough
discussion of the Interviewers' Guide, one or more mock interviews with role playing, and the use of
the tape recordings of completed interviews to illustrate both effective and ineffective interviewing
techniques.
207. Project meetings devoted primarily to instrument development were held July 14-15, 1990, at
the Washington and Lee University School of Law, and November 11, 1991, at the Institute of
Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland.
208. The original plans called for a two-hour juror interview, with one hour devoted to a common
core of questions to be used in all states. The other hour was available for questions of particular interest
to each investigator in his or her own state. Our instrument development efforts, involving meetings,
pretests, and numerous contacts by phone and e-mail, made the various investigators aware that many
of their own particular interests were shared by the others and led to a consensus that all would benefit
by expanding the common core of questions to cover more of these shared interests. Our two pretests
further indicated that jurors were willing-indeed eager-to give us very lengthy interviews on what
many described in terms such as "the most important experience of my life." We were extremely
gratified at the readiness of respondents to provide us with detailed accounts of their experiences.
These factors led us to extend the time originally planned for the interview by roughly one hour.
Moreover, the jurors' lengthy accounts of their experiences and their thinking about it, as revealed in
the pretests, quickly persuaded us of the need to tape record the interviews, absent objections from the
respondents. See infra note 210. While most juror interviews have taken about three hours, a few have
lasted more than seven hours. In Kentucky, for example, the first 30 interviews averaged three hours
and forty minutes; when the six lengthiest interviews were excluded, the interviews averaged over three
hours. See Sandys, supra note 198, at 1190.
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usually conducted in the home of the respondent.0 9 With the juror's
permission, the interview is tape recorded."' The jurors have generally been
quite forthcoming and candid in their responses; most have readily understood
the questions and have been responsive to probes for further details of their
thinking and behavior.
b. Additional Data Sources
In some states, investigators are also working with two additional sources
of data: the trial transcripts of their sample trials, and data from interviews
with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in these cases. The trial
transcripts provide a verbatim record of attorneys' motions and arguments,
judges' rulings, witness' testimony, and exhibits. They also indicate how the
judge instructed the jury to make its sentencing decision and whether the jury
asked the judge for further instruction during sentencing deliberation. Where
jurors claim that the evidence was especially persuasive or confusing, the
transcripts may be used to understand what produced these reactions. Thus,
the trial transcripts are particularly useful in ascertaining the nature and
strength of the evidence presented at both the guilt and sentencing phases of
the trial, in evaluating jurors' recall and/or understanding of the evidence,
arguments, and jury instructions, and in resolving disagreements in the
accounts jurors give regarding what actually transpired during the trial.
Interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys have typically
addressed the trial strategies of the prosecution and defense, the nature and
strength of the evidence, and their impressions of the jury and its verdict.
These interviews are conducted to help understand how prosecutors and
defense attorneys attempt to influence the thinking of jurors. Specifically,
interviewers seek to learn how consciously and prominently prosecutors and
defense attorneys advance certain themes in the organization and presentation
of evidence and in the formulation of opening and closing arguments.
209. The length of the interviews and the premium on avoiding interruptions has sometimes led to
scheduling them at places other than the respondent's home, such as the workplace, restaurants, or
libraries. The interviews are typically completed in a single visit, although a few have required a second
sitting or a follow-up phone call.
210. Our pretests revealed that many jurors wished to explain or elaborate on their answers to
specific questions and to "unburden" themselves with extended accounts of matters they felt were
important for understanding their thinking or actions at various points in the trial. Their descriptions in
these interviews of the events and dynamics of the trial and their detailed accounts of their experiences
and reactions asjurors are remarkable and invaluable for purposes of qualitative analysis. This persuaded
us that tape recording the juror interviews (with their permission) was essential in order to capture the
full richness and detail of their open-ended responses. These tapes have also proved extremely valuable
in our data preparation activities, especially for purposes of checking the accuracy and completeness of
the interviewers' written entries on the instrument and for providing us with feedback on the
performance of individual interviewers. We have found that roughly four out of every five jurors are
willing to have their interview tape recorded.
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c. Current Status of the Data Collection
The CJP data collection is ongoing. Expanding the sample from eight to
fourteen states, lengthening the juror interviews from two to three hours, and
transcribing of tape recorded interviews have generally added to the time
needed for the collection and preparation of the data. The target number of
juror interviews has been completed (or nearly so) in seven states-one-half
of those presently participating in the Project; the number of interviews that
have already been conducted in two of these states well .exceeds the target
sample. The interviews from these seven states have been coded and
computerized for analysis, and the analysis-ready data have been returned to
the respective investigators. Progress has been slower for various reasons in
the other states,2t" ' but it is anticipated that the original interviewing targets
will be met in most of them. The acquisition of trial transcripts and interviews
with judges and attorneys has yet to be completed in most states.
C. Dissemination of Findings
The CJP investigators began working with the qualitative interview data
from specific trials-the open-ended portions of the juror interviews that
provide extensive narrative accounts of jurors' experiences and decision-
making-soon after the interviews for some of the cases were completed. 2 2
The statistical analyses of the quantitative data-the many structured questions
about jurors' thinking and reactions to the trial experience-must necessarily
await the accumulation of sufficient numbers of interviews to permit
statistically reliable inferences from the data. As such, statistical analyses
have appeared only for the first several states where the target number of
juror interviews have been completed." 3 The interest of scholars and the
legal community in the* CJP is evident in the attention this research has
211. Some investigators have been delayed by difficulties in tracking down the full inventory of
capital trials since 1988 and obtaining juror lists for sampling purposes. In addition, the investigators
themselves have varied in the time they could commit to the project. The summer months have proven
to be the best time for organized interviewing efforts, especially for the investigators who are law faculty
members or who employ law students as interviewers.
212. Some early qualitative results were reported in Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-
Verdict Debriefingfor Jurors in Emotionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333 (1993).
213. The structured interview data from California, Florida, and South Carolina-the first three states
to complete the target sample of juror interviews-have received the most statistical attention. Limited
statistical analyses have been performed with the data from all three states. See Bowers, supra note 22,
at 162-71. More detailed analyses have been conducted with the data from South Carolina and Florida.
See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 72 (discussing the South Carolina study); Goetz, supra note 203
(discussing the study of Florida jurors).
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attracted at professional meetings,2 14 and in citations to the first published
research articles from the project in a recent Supreme Court decision.1 5
The articles that follow are an extension of these developments. They
represent research in progress. These articles are based on results obtained or
updated just as the data collection in the state was completed, or as sampling
targets were in sight. In all instances, the articles represent extensions and
refinements of analyses presented at earlier professional meetings." 6 Three
of these papers draw heavily on the rich narrative reports and responses of
jurors to describe their thinking about the crimes for which they must
punish," 7 to identify the influences that make them change their minds (or
at least their votes), about what the punishment should be,2"' and to assess
their readiness to shoulder the responsibility for their life or death deci-
sions; 219 one paper relies foremost on jurors' responses to the structured
questions to learn how well jurors understand the instructions for deciding
what punishment should be imposed.2 0
The final Part of this Article will also extend the existing research by
previewing some highlights from the responses of jurors to the structured
interview questions in the seven states where the target number of juror inter-
views has now been, or is about to be, completed. It examines questions that
bear on the issues raised in the papers that follow and illustrates the potential
interplay between the qualitative and quantitative data. Its-purpose is partially
to set the stage for the analyses that follow, partially to illustrate how the
quantitative and qualitative data can complement one another, and partially to
demonstrate the promise of more refined statistical analyses that will follow.
IV. A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE QUANTITATIVE DATA
Now that CJP investigators have largely met the target number of juror
interviews in seven states, we are in a position to take an early look at the
responses of a sizable sample of jurors to the structured interview questions.
I have chosen results that contain some surprises and raise questions that will
be the focus of more detailed upcoming analyses of these data. This early
look at jurors' responses to a few selected questions will be limited to simple
214. Panel sessions devoted to CJP have been held at the annual meetings of the Law and Society
Association and the American Society of Criminology since 1991. At these sessions, CJP investigators
have reviewed and discussed project design issues, presented early findings, and preparecsome working
papers for circulation.
215. Two published reports of findings from these data were cited by the Supreme Court in Simmons
v. South Carolina. 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2193 (1994) (citing Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 72); id. at 2197
n.9 (citing Bowers, supra note 22).
216. References to these presentations appear in the first footnote of each paper.
217. See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from
the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995).
218. See Sandys, supra note 198.
219. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility
in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995).
220. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 72.
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frequency distributions and confined to jurors from the seven states where the
target number of juror interviews has been, or soon will be, met.22" '
A. Recall
During the interviews, it was common for the jurors to comment that
serving as a capital juror was a "truly memorable experience," something they
"would never forget," because, as some added, "it was the most important
thing I've ever done." We can evaluate how well jurors actually remember
various aspects of this experience in sophisticated ways with information from
trial transcripts and other case records, through the responses of the other
jurors from the same trial, and by the internal consistency of a juror's
responses throughout the interview. A useful starting point, however, is to ask
the jurors directly how well they remember the successive stages of the
experience, as we did in the following question:
How well do you remember each of the following stages of the trial?
TABLE 2
Not (N)
Very Fairly Not at of
Well Well Well All Cases
The Selection of the
Jury 67.6% 29.1% 3.0% 0.3% (667)
Hearing Evidence
About [the
Defendant's] Guilt 59.0% 38.2% 2.6% 0.2% (659)
Jury Deliberations
About [the
Defendant's] Guilt 67.7% 30.8% 1.4% 0.2% (647)
Hearing Evidence
About [the
Defendant's]
Punishment 55.0% 37.5% 6.8% 0.8% (662)
Jury Deliberations
About Defendant's
Punishment 70.3% 27.2% 2.1% 0.3% (661)
221. The tabulations that follow are based on a total of 684 interviews conducted with capital jurors
in Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The
percentages shown in the tables are based on all valid responses to the respective questions, excluding
"no answers," "don't knows," or missing responses. The number of valid responses to each question is
shown in parentheses under the heading "(N) of Cases."
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Most jurors say that they remember each stage of the trial "very well";
virtually all of the remaining jurors say that they remember each stage "fairly
well." At both the guilt and punishment phases of the trial, jurors appear to
remember jury deliberations somewhat better than they do the presentation of
evidence; they remember punishment deliberations best and evidence about
punishment least. Yet, none of these variations are departures of more than
ten percentage points from a relatively consistent 60% who claimed that they
remember each stage "very well" and another 35% who say that they
remember it at least "fairly well." In more refined analyses, we can, of
course, concentrate on the responses of those whose recall is superior, as
indicated by these self reports or by more sophisticated objective indications.
For now, we examine the responses of all jurors from these seven states.
B. The Guilt Phase
Jurors' responses to questions about the guilt phase of the trial suggest that
many of them began considering aggravation and punishment while they were
still deciding on the defendant's guilt; and indeed, that many began to take a
stand on what the defendant's punishment should be well before being
exposed to the statutory guidelines for this decision. We see these indications
in their responses to questions about topics they discussed during the jury's
guilt deliberations and in their answers to a question about what they thought
the punishment should be prior to the punishment phase of the trial.
1. Considerations of Aggravation and Punishment
When the questioning turned to the jury's deliberations at the guilt phase
of the trial, we asked jurors about a number of specific topics they might have
discussed, including some that are legally irrelevant or impermissible in
determining guilt, such as the 'defendant's likely future dangerousness 222 and
jurors' feelings about the appropriate punishment-considerations explicitly
reserved for the later punishment phase of the trial. Specifically, we asked:
222. Some aggravating factors are relevant to guilt deliberations in states with "narrowing statutes"
where defendants must be convicted of aggravated murder to be eligible for the death penalty. See Table
I, supra p. 1079. The defendant's future dangerousness, however, is not an element of aggravated
murder and, hence, is not a relevant aggravating consideration at the guilt stage of the trial under any
current death penalty statute.
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How much did the discussion [about the
jurors focus on the following topics?
defendant's guilt] among the
TABLE 3
(N)
Great Fair Not Not of
Deal Amount Much at all Cases
Defendant's
Dangerousness if
Ever Back in
Society 35.7% 26.4% 19.0% 18.9% (641)
Juror's Feelings
About the Right
Punishment 49.7% 15.2% 11.0% 24.1% - (630)
Jurors were evidently concerned with the defendant's future dangerousness
and the punishment to be imposed during their deliberation on the defendant's
guilt. More than six out of ten said the jury's guilt deliberations focused on
each of these topics a "great deal" or a "fair amount." One-half of the jurors
said that there was a great deal of discussion about the "right punishment."
Conscious that jurors might not clearly distinguish between the guilt and
punishment deliberations in response to this question,223 and that some
topics discussed during guilt deliberations might not have actually figured in
the decision-making about guilt, we asked a further question explicitly worded
to focus the juror's attention exclusively on the defendant's punishment as a
relevant consideration in the jury's decision about the defendant's guilt:
In deciding guilt, did jurors talk about whether or not the defendant
would, or should, get the death penalty?
TABLE 4
Yes No (N) of Cases
37.2% 62.8% (624)
Here, too, a sizable number of jurors recall that in deciding guilt, there was
explicit discussion of what the defendant's punishment would or should be.
Obviously, some of those who said punishment was discussed a great deal
223. In subsequent analyses, we will be able to use the responses of all four jurors from a trial for
a more reliable indication of the jury's behavior. Their agreement will be a more reliable indication of
the objective reality than the report of any one juror, and such agreement can be further weighted by
the reliability of the individual juror's responses as noted supra at Part IV.A.
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during guilt deliberations (in response to the question analyzed in Table 3)
were unwilling to say that it actually figured in the decision-making about
guilt (in response to the more focused question analyzed in Table 4). But the
fact that nearly four out of ten claimed that jurors talked about what the
punishment would or should be in deciding guilt indicates that the improper
consideration of punishment played a role in many of these capital trials." 4
2. Timing of the Punishment Decision
In addition to these questions about what the jury did as a group, CJP
investigators also asked the individual jurors about their own personal
thinking and decision-making with respect to the defendant's punishment prior
to the sentencing phase of the trial. In particular, we asked whether they had
come to a decision on punishment, what they thought the punishment should
be, and how convinced they were of their decision. The first question and
their responses were as follows:
After the jury found [defendant's name] guilty of capital murder but
before you heard any evidence or testimony about what the punishment
should be, did you then think the defendant should be given...
TABLE 5
Death Life (N) of
Sentence? Sentence? Undecided Cases
29.5% 20.7% 49.8% (634)
One-half of the jurors were undecided, but the other one-half said that they
had chosen (more or less firmly) between a life or death sentence at this stage
of the trial. A second follow-up question, addressed only to those who, at.this
stage, thought that the defendant should be given a life or death sentence,
asked:
224. Whether the chief role of such punishment discussions was to enlist support for a capital murder
conviction by underscoring the abhorrence of the crime and the determination to see the defendant
subjected to the ultimate punishment the law can impose, to confirm a bargain for a life sentence in
exchange for a capital murder conviction, or for some other reason, must await a detailed analysis of
the narrative comments and clarification which jurors offered in connection with their answers to this
structured question.
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How strongly did you think so?
TABLE 6
Absolutely Pretty Not Too (N) of
Convinced Sure Sure Cases
64.6% 30.5% 4.8% (311)
Thus, most of the jurors who had decided what the punishment should be
before the sentencing phase of the trial were "absolutely convinced" of their
punishment decision, and nearly all the rest were at least "pretty sure." In
effect, it appears that three out of ten jurors had essentially made up their
minds, and another two in ten were leaning one way or the other, before
hearing from the judge about the standards that should guide their sentencing
decisions.225
C. The Punishment Phase
The interviews, both the structured questions and the open-ended probes,
focused primarily on the sentencing phase of the trial. We designed our
questions to reveal how individual jurors and the jury as a group reached their
sentencing decisions. The following is a review of jurors' responses to a few
of the structured questions that deal with sentencing guidelines, jury
instructions, and responsibility for the punishment imposed.
1. Guidelines and Instructions
If statutory standards are to guide the exercise of sentencing discretion, they
must, of course, be understood and applied in the course of actually making
the sentencing decision. Among the various questions we asked to tap jurors'
understanding of sentencing guidelines, the responses to the question
regarding the substance of the statutory standards were notably unsettling.
Beforehand, let me say that none of the seven states for which juror responses
are tabulated has guidelines that "require" the death penalty to be imposed
upon a finding of aggravation.226 This question about jurors understanding
of statutory guidelines asked:
225. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 103, at 486 (finding that many jurors make up their minds
about the defendant's guilt before the jury begins its guilt deliberations). Kalven and Zeisel draw this
inference from the power of the first jury vote to predict the final verdict to convict or acquit. The first
jury vote during guilt deliberations comes, of course, after hearing the guilt evidence and the judge's
instructions to the jury for deciding guilt. Id. Here, however, the evidence pertains to the punishment
decision before punishment deliberations, before the judge's sentencing instructions, and before the
presentation of evidence about what the punishment should be.
226. Although "directed" statutes, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, might be interpreted
to require the death penalty once jurors make certain findings of fact, none of the seven states examined
here employ such statutes.
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After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe that the law
required you to impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that the
TABLE 7
(N)of
Yes No Undecided Cases
Defendant's Conduct
Was Heinous, Vile,
or Depraved 40.9% 57.7% 1.4% (655)
Defendant Would Be
Dangerous in the Future 31.9% 66.6% 1.5% (652)
Contrary to the laws of their states, four out of ten capital jurors believed
that they were required to impose the death penalty if they found that the
crime was heinous, vile, or depraved, and three out of ten thought that the
death penalty was required if they found that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future. This misunderstanding of statutory standards
obviously biases the sentencing decision in favor of death to the extent that
jurors do, in fact, find that the e, idence proves that the crime was heinous,
vile, or depraved, or that the defendant would be dangerous. The jurors'
answers to a further question are relevant here:
After hearing all of the evidence [at the punishment phase of the trial],
did you believe it proved that the...
TABLE 8
(N)
of
Yes No Undecided Cases
Defendant's Conduct
Was Heinous, Vile,
or Depraved 79.8% 15.6% 4.6% (674)
Defendant Would Be
Dangerous in the Future 75.6% 18.0% 6.4% (672)
Three out of four participating jurors said that the evidence proved that the
crime was heinous, vile, or depraved, and that the defendant would be
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dangerous in the future.227 In combination with the percentages of those who
believed that the death penalty was required if these factors were proved, it
appears that between 21% and 33% of the jurors mistakenly believed that the
state's proof of heinousness required them to vote for the death penalty. In
addition, between 8% and 24% ofjurors wrongly believed that evidence of the
defendant's dangerousness required them to vote in favor of death.228
This death-biased misunderstanding of sentencing guidelines at the
punishment phase of the trial is not necessarily independent of premature
decision-making about punishment at the guilt phase; indeed, the two may go
hand in hand. Note that believing the death penalty is required when
aggravation is proven has the effect of discounting or dismissing mitiga-
tion-the fundamentally new concern or agentic shift of the punishment phase
of the trial. An early punishment decision based largely on evidence of
aggravation developed at the guilt phase of the trial is, thus, insulated from
later evidence and arguments for a life sentence. For jurors who became
absolutely convinced or even pretty sure of what the punishment should be
before the sentencing phase of the trial, this misunderstanding serves to
preserve their premature punishment decisions.
The preceding evidence that many jurors discussed aggravating factors such
as dangerousness, and indeed talked about what the punishment should be
during guilt deliberations, and that a good many were "absolutely convinced"
of what the punishment should be before -the punishment phase of the trial,
suggests that the statutory guidelines as conveyed in the judge's sentencing
instructions may be more of a foil than a guide for the punishment decision.
One question CJP researchers asked bears specifically on this issue:
227. There is some evidence that these two factors serve as "catch-all" aggravators that may be used
when others do not apply; in particular, the use of the "heinous, vile, atrocious, etc." aggravator has
been found to vary considerably apart from the aggravation of the crime. Bowers & Pierce, supra note
79, at 580 n.34; see also BLACK, supra note 68, at 29; Dix, supra note 68; Rosen, supra note 68.
The Court has been of two minds about the so-called "catch-air' aggravators. In Jurek v. Texas, it
held that Texas' future dangerousness question was broad enough to incorporate considerations of both
aggravation and mitigation and thus preserve the constitutionality of a Texas statute that did not
otherwise explicitly provide for considerations of mitigation. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In Godfrey v. Georgia, on the other hand, the Court faulted the
application of Georgia's wanton, vile, or heinous aggravator as too vague, thus permitting possibly
arbitrary or prejudicial considerations under Georgia's statute, which explicitly calls for the consideration
of mitigation without enumerating any such factors. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
228. The minimum estimates are calculated according to the following formula: [% ofjurors saying
"death required" - (100% - % of jurors saying "evidence proved")]. The formula for the maximum
estimates is as follows: [% of jurors saying "death required" X % of jurors saying "evidence proved"].
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Would you say the judge's sentencing instructions to the jury [simply
provided a framework for the decision most jurors had already made]?
TABLE 9
Yes No (N) of Cases
74.1% 25.9% (634)
Here, the timing is unambiguous. The perception of at least three out of
four jurors is that the judge's instructions to the jury simply provided a
framework for a decision already made by most jurors. This suggests that
their misunderstanding of what the law requires may be the result of selective
perceptions, perhaps tailored to fit the decisions they had already made.
2. Responsibility for the Punishment
One criticism of guided discretion capital statutes is that they tend to allay
jurors' sense of responsibility for their life or death sentencing decisions by
appearing to provide them with an authoritative formula that yields the
"correct" or "required" punishment.229 We have seen above that a good
many jurors have the mistaken impression that the law requires a particular
punishment when certain kinds of aggravation are proven. Weisberg has
argued that statutory guidelines serve less, if at all, to guide the exercise of
sentencing discretion than to diminish jurors' sense of responsibility for the
awful punishment they may impose21----perhaps by displacing it. That is, the
punishment appears to be a result of the defendant's crime or what the law
229. This challenge is perhaps best articulated by Robert Weisberg, who argues that the penalty
phase juror, deciding whether or not to sentence the defendant to death, is in a position similar to that
of the subjects in Stanley Milgram's classic program of research on obedience to authority in which
subjects were instructed by an authority figure to inflict "painful" punishment on a "learner" in an
adjacent room. Weisberg, supra note 48, at 305. Milgram found that his subjects were willing to
increase the pain-inducing electric shocks despite the ersatz'sounds of their victims suffering, because
they attributed responsibility for the pain they were apparently inflicting to the experimenter who
devised the research, and not to themselves-they saw themselves as merely the agents of the
experimenter who were not responsible for the punishing pain they imposed. Milgram's interpretation
of his findings was that, in response to instructions from an authority figure, a moral state is induced
which he called an "agentic shift," a state of mind in which a man feels responsible to the authority
directing him but feels no responsibility for the content of the actions that the authority prescribes.
Morality does not disappear, but acquires a radically different focus. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE
TO AuTHoRrry: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 132-34 (1974).
230. See Weisberg, supra note 48, at 343 ("In the very special situation of the criminal courtroom
and the death penalty trial, it seems fairly plausible that a lay jury exposed to the mystifying language
of legal formality may indeed allow its moral sense to be distorted.). In this view, a jury naturally holds
values against taking life, or harming another, just as Milgram's subjects did. But these values can be
subordinated by features of the situation in which an authority figure is perceived as giving orders.
Weisberg postulates that the modem penalty jury is given instructions which provide no real guidance,
but have the appearance of legal rules. These pseudo-instructions dilute the jury's sense of responsibility,
rather'than guiding discretion. Id.
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prescribes rather than the decision-making of the juror himself.23' To see
where capital jurors located responsibility for punishment, we asked them to:
Rank the following from "most" through "least" responsible for [the
defendant"s] punishment. [Give 1 for "most" through 5 for "least"
responsible.]
TABLE 10232
Most< >Least
1 2 3 4 5 (N=)
Defendant - Because of
his conduct determined
punishment 46.1% 10.7% 6.4% 7.6% 29.1% (605)
Law - states what
punishment applies 34.4% 39.2% 7.8% 11.2% 7.4% (605)
Jury - votes for sentence 8.8% 23.3% 38.8% 25.5% 3.6% (605)
Individual Juror - since
jury's decision depends
upon the vote of each
juror 6.4% 13.7% 26.8% 29.4% 23.6% (605)
Judge - who imposes the
sentence 4.5% 12.9% 20.2% 26.1% 36.4% (605)
Unmistakably, jurors placed responsibility for the defendant's punishment
elsewhere. Eight out of ten jurors feel that the defendant or the law is the
most responsible for the defendant's punishment. More jurors believe that the
greatest responsibility lies with the defendant than with the law. The idea that
the defendant's punishment is his own responsibility may be especially
attractive because it blames the culprit for what the jury must do. Note,
231. While it is true that the sane defendant is deemed responsible for his crime and that his/her
action would not be a crime except for the criminal code that forbids it, the question of responsibility
for the defendant's punishment is a different matter. The criminal sanction is society's response to a
particular defendant's crime defined as such by the criminal law; responsibility for it rests squarely on
the shoulders of those chosen, authorized, and obligated by society to decide what the punishment
should be. Where statutes mandate or require a particular punishment upon conviction, the law might
be deemed responsible for the defendant's punishment, although even in this situation, jurors as agents
of the law may exercise responsibility in the form of "jury nullification." Robin West has argued that
"the defendant should be constitutionally entitled" to "morally responsible decision making" on the part
of jurors. Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 87 (1989).
232. The percentages reflected in Table 10 are based only on the responses of the 605 jurors who
completed all five parts of the question by correctly assigning ranks to each of the five options, so that
the ranks sum to 15.
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however, that between one-fourth and one-third of the jurors appear to
distinguish between blaming the defendant for his crime and for his
punishment; thus, 29.1% of the jurors believed that the defendant is the least
responsible of the five named agents for his punishment.
By contrast, only a tiny minority (6.4%) believed that the individual juror
was most responsible for the punishment. Only a few more (8.8%) believed
that the jury as a body was most responsible. Altogether, only three in twenty
(15.2%) believe that the jurors, as a group or individually, were the agents
most responsible for the defendant's punishment. The jury ranked third, the
individual juror fourth, and the judge fifth in responsibility for the punish-
ment,233 as indicated both by the percentage of jurors responding "most
responsible" and by the modal rankings of the five alternatives.
The responsibility felt by jurors when making the punishment decision has
been a concern for the Supreme Court and is addressed in two of the articles
that follow. 234 In Caldwell v. Mississippi,2 5 the Court stated that a belief
233. Among the seven states the CJP is studying, Alabama and Florida permit the judge to override
the jury's sentencing decision. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. In these two "judge
override" states, as compared to the five "jury binding" states, one might expect even fewer jurors to
see themselves as responsible for the defendant's punishment and, correspondingly, more jurors to view
the judge as the responsible agent. Juror responses, tabulated separately below for the "judge override"
and "jury binding" states, show that this is indeed the case.
PERCENT SAYING THAT A GivEN AGENT WAS MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR
DEFENDANT'S PUNISHMENT: "JUDGE OVERRIDE' VS. "JURY BINDING" STATES
Judge Override Jury Binding
Defendant 42.6% 47.3%
Law 36.8% 33.6%
Jury 7.1% 9.3%
Individual Juror 3.2% 7.6%
Judge 10.3% 2.4%
(N) of Cases (155) (450)
In the "judge override" states, the judge ranks third, ahead of the jury and the individual juror as the
most responsible agent for the defendant's punishment. Indeed, just as many jurors saw the judge as the
one most responsible for the defendant's punishment (10.3%) as saw either the jury as a group (7.1%)
or the individual juror (3.2%) combined. And just as virtually no jurors saw themselves as most
responsible in the "judge override" states (3.2%), so too, virtually none saw the judge as most
responsible in the "jury binding" states (2.4%).
Aside from the difference in the rankings of the judge relative to the two categories of jurors,
however, juror assignment of responsibility is remarkably similar in the "judge override" and "jury
binding" states. The defendant and the law rank first and second in responsibility-with four out of five
jurors viewing either one or the other as most responsible for the defendant's punishment in both types
of states.
234. See Hoffmann, supra note 219; Sarat, supra note 217.
235. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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among jurors that the responsibility for the ultimate determination of death
rests with others presents an "intolerable danger. 23 6 The Court reasoned:
A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very
unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfort-
able choice. They are confronted with evidence and argument on the issue
of whether another should die, and they are asked to decide that issue on
behalf of the community. Moreover, they are given only partial guidance
as to how their judgment should be exercised, leaving them with substantial
discretion. Given such a situation, the uncorrected suggestion that the
responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others
presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize
the importance of its role. Indeed, one can easily imagine that in a case in
which the jury is divided on the proper sentence, the presence of appellate
review could effectively be used as an argument for why those jurors who
are reluctant to invoke the death sentence should nevertheless give in.23
One question we asked about jurors' responsibility for the defendant's
punishment focused quite specifically on the issue raised in Caldwell; namely,
the extent to which jurors might attribute responsibility for the punishment to
judges who subsequently review their decision. Specifically, the question
asked:
When you were considering the punishment, did you think that whether
the defendant lived or died was...
TABLE 11
Strictly the jury's responsibility and no one else's. 27.2%
Mostly the jury's responsibility, but the judge or appeals
courts take over responsibility whenever they overrule or
change the jury's decision. 29.9%
Partly the jury's responsibility and partly the
responsibility of the judge and appeals courts who review
the jury's sentence in all cases. 24.3%
Mostly the responsibility of the judge and appeals courts;
we make the first decision but they make the final
decision. 18.6%
(N) of Cases (655)
When they are making the punishment decision, most jurors think of
themselves as sharing responsibility for their decision with the trial or
appellate court judges. Only one in four jurors (27.2%) believe that the jury
236. Id. at 333.
237. Id. (citations omitted).
1096 [Vol. 70:1043
1995] CP RATIONALE, DESIGN, & PREVIEW OFEARLYFINDINGS 1097
alone is strictly responsible for the punishment. The remaining three-fourths
saw themselves as sharing responsibility with the judicial authorities, because
their decision may be overturned, because it will be reviewed, or because it
is only the first step in a process that will determine the defendant's
punishment.
2 38
Evidently, jurors see others as responsible for the defendant's punishment-
primarily the defendant who has committed the capital offense and the law
that authorizes the death penalty for such crimes-more so than judicial
authorities or jurors themselves. When jurors are asked to allocate responsi-
bility more narrowly between themselves and judicial authorities who handle
the case, most jurors see responsibility as shared with trial and appellate
judges; only one in four capital jurors (27.2%) said the defendant's punish-
ment was "strictly the jury's responsibility" and fewer did so in death than in
life cases. There is obviously a serious question under these guided discretion
capital statutes about who is taking responsibility for whether the defendant
will live or die.
Consistent with Weisberg's argument that statutory guidelines serve fore-
most to replace jurors' sense of responsibility with the authority of law'-
the law more consistently than the defendant outranks the jury or the
individual juror in responsibility for the defendant's punishment. Three-
fourths of jurors rank the law as either first or second in responsibility. This
preeminence of the law, over the juror or the jury, is an apparent testimony
238. The Court's observation in the above quoted passage from Caldwell that some jurors may be
induced to vote for death by the argument that their decision will be reviewed by judicial authorities
implies that full acceptance of responsibility for the defendant's punishment may be even less among
jurors in death than in life cases. Jurors' responses in Table 11, above, when tabulated separately for
life and death cases, are, in fact, consistent with the Court's supposition.
PERCENTAGE INDICATING THE RESPONSIBILITY THEY FELT WHEN
DECIDING PUNISHMENT-BY THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE JURY
Death Cases Life Cases
Strictly jury responsible 23.6% 31.2%
Jury unless overruled 32.4% 26.8%
Jury with reviewing judge 26.4% 22.1%
Jury first, judges final 17.6% 19.9%
(N) of Cases (330) (317)
Only two of ten jurors in death cases,.as compared to three of ten jurors in life cases, see themselves
as fully responsible for the defendant's punishment. While accepting strict responsibility is the most
common response of life case jurors, two other responses are more common among the jurors in death
cases-the feeling that they share responsibility with judges who will review and who may overturn
their decisions-precisely the danger the Court declared intolerable in Caldwell. Note that the 7.6%
difference in affirming strict jury responsibility between life and death cases represents a 32.2% greater
affirmation of jury responsibility among the life than among the death jurors (because the overall
percentage of jurors who accept such responsibility is relatively small).
239. Weisberg, supra note 48, at 343.
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to the desire of jurors to defer to the law or to see themselves as simply
"following the law," whether or not they understand its requirements or
directives. Though jurors may misunderstand statutory guidelines, they still
seek the cover of law for the awful responsibility of their life or death
decision.
D. Adversarial Balance
In Payne v. Tennessee,240 the Court reversed its earlier holdings that
victim-impact evidence and arguments were impermissible at the sentencing
hearings of capital trials.24' Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that evidence
of the impact of the crime on the victim's survivors and the broader
community should be allowed in order to offset the advantages that otherwise
favor the defendant at the sentencing stage of a capital trial.242 One set of
questions we asked regarding the adversarial balance between the prosecution
and defense suggests that the prosecution suffers no disadvantages-at least
in jurors' eyes. To the contrary, jurors' responses present a picture of stark
pro-prosecution one-sidedness. We asked:
240. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
241. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808; Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
242. Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-25.
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In your judgment, by how much did the prosecution or the defense have
the advantage in these respects? [G = "Great Advantage," M =
"Moderate Advantage, " S = "Slight Advantage']
TABLE 12"
NP
ea
i r (N)
Prosecution t t Defense of
h y Cases
e
r
G M S G M S
Did better job
of communi-
cating with
jury 30.9 22.7 8.7 31.4 1.2 3.3 1.8 (669)
Prepared case
better for trial 38.7 16.6 6.9 31.3 1.8 2.7 1.9 (667)
Possessed
more money
& resources 19.6 14.3 6.2 53.2 2.2 2.7 1.8 (601)
Stronger
commitment
to winning
case 28.3 15.3 7.4 40.2 3.3 3.5 2.0 (660)
Fought harder
at guilt phase
of trial 36.8 17.4 7.4 26.3 4.1 5.3 2.9 (666)
Fought harder
at punishment
phase of trial 24.8 13.2 6.2 24.8 13.2 12.4 5.3 (660)
. With the exception of the figures contained in column 9 ((N) of Cases),
all figures represent the percentage of capital jurors who responded in a
particular manner.
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The imbalance is obvious. Over one-half of the jurors (62.2%) believed that
the prosecution had the advantage in preparing the case for trial, in communi-
cating with the jury (62.3%), in commitment to winning the case (5 1.0%), and
in fighting at the guilt phase of the trial (61.6%). Moreover, most jurors who
gave the advantage to the prosecution, said that the prosecution's advantage
was "great" rather than "moderate" or "slight." Fewer said that the prosecu-
tion had the advantage in terms of money and resources, with most jurors
saying that neither side had the advantage (53.2%).243 One out of ten jurors,
or fewer, said the defense had the advantage in any of these respects.
The only area in which more than one in ten jurors believe that the defense
had the advantage-and in which they are not outnumbered at least five to
one by those who give the advantage to the prosecution-is in fighting hard
at the punishment stage of the trial. Three of ten jurors (30.9%) give the
sentencing phase advantage to the defense, close to (but still below) the four
in ten (44.2%) who gave this advantage to the prosecution. Whether the stark
adversarial imbalance in all other respects casts the defense attorney's
readiness to fight at the punishment phase of the trial more as an act of
desperation than as a justifiable bid for a punishment other than death in
jurors' minds is an open question.
The magnitude of this imbalance between the capital trial adversaries in the
minds of jurors is remarkable. Some of the disparity could be due to
ineffectiveness of defense counsel,244 as reflected in the relatively objective
areas of preparing cases for trial and communicating with the jury. In
addition, some of the difference could be attributable to the "prosecution
proneness" associated with "death qualification" in jury selection,2 45 as
reflected in the more subjective judgments of commitment and motivation.
Yet, the magnitude and one-sidedness of these disparities in the perceived
motivation and performance of the two parties suggest something more.
Perhaps jurors' opinions and perceptions of the attorneys tended to
crystallize early in these trials-perhaps by the time the prosecution had
convinced them to hand down a capital murder conviction. Jurors' impressions
of who had the advantage may thus be heavily influenced by the guilt trial
experience where the prosecution surely had the upper hand. Thus, in addition
to the ineffectiveness of defense counsel and the proneness to favor the
243. The "no answers" were roughly three times greater on this particular measure than in any of
the other areas of adversarial advantage, perhaps because jurors felt that assessing the availability of
resources was more a matter of guesswork on their part. Jurors' tendency to say that neither side had
the advantage on this particular index, and to see the advantage as less extreme among those who did
give the advantage to the prosecution, could also be the reflection of a culturally inspired egalitarian
presumption of a level playing field in the allocation of resources between the parties to a fair trial.
244. There is a growing body of documentation and systematic evidence of ineffectiveness of counsel
for the defense. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); see also Susan J. Craighead,
Towards Atticus Finch, Assessing and Improving the Quality of Capital Trial Lawyers: Alabama, the
Eleventh Circuit, and a Proposal for a New Approach to Appellate Review (1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
245. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-73 (1986) (discussing the literature on death
qualification).
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prosecution, the guilt trial experience in the bifurcated trial where the same
jurors decide both guilt and punishment may close some jurors' minds to the
messenger and, by association, to the message of mitigation that comes
later-much as a vigorous guilt defense tends to close off remorse as a
subsequent defense mitigation strategy. 4 6 Whatever its causes, however, the
implication of this perceived adversarial imbalance is that advocacy on behalf
of a punishment less than death is in the hands of someone most jurors have
come to regard as inferior or second rate, at least by these indicators of
performance and motivation.
CONCLUSION
The early indications in our research-published here and elsewhere24 -
begin to sketch out a picture of the exercise of capital sentencing discretion
that differs from that found in current Supreme Court precedent. These are
only the first steps on the path to a comprehensive and detailed understanding
of how capital jurors actually make their life or death decision. Yet, the
emerging picture is noteworthy for the questions it raises concerning the
Supreme Court's presumptions about the exercise of capital sentencing
discretion.
The preliminary findings presented above are consistent with an other-
directed, outcome-driven decision process in which, for many jurors, the
critical choice of punishment appears to be formed, and even finalized,
relatively early in the process-well before the presumed guidance of
sentencing evidence, arguments, and instructions. Accordingly, most jurors see
sentencing instructions more as a framework for a decision already made than
as guidance for a decision yet to be made. They transfer responsibility for the
punishment decision to the law or even to the defendant, presumably because
of their own personal uneasiness about taking responsibility for whether
someone lives or dies.
The articles that follow also present a picture of the capital-sentencing
decision at this still-early stage of our research that is more consistent with
the outcome-driven decision model than with any of the other models in the
literature discussed above. Sarat's depiction of Georgia jurors' anger and fear
about the crime and criminal suggests that the punishment is strongly
vindictive and vengeful-less a function of the defendant's blameworthiness
than of his inscrutability.24 Sandys' evidence that many Kentucky jurors are
absolutely convinced of what the punishment should be before the sentencing
hearing, instructions, or deliberations suggests that sentencing guidelines can
play only a minor role-perhaps more as justification for a decision already
made than as a guide in making such a decision.249 Luginbuhl and Howe's
246. Goodpaster, supra note 75, at 334-35.
247. See Bowers, supra note 22; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 72.
248. See Sarat, supra note 217.
249. See Sandys, supra note 198.
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showing that the misunderstandings of sentencing instructions by North
Carolina jurors' tends to support a death sentence in large part by minimizing
the weight of mitigating considerations.25 Finally, Hoffmann's evidence that
jurors are extremely uneasy about taking responsibility for the life or death
punishment decision suggests that the sentencing guidelines are more a
welcome rationalization for an already decided punishment than a genuine
rationale that determines what the punishment should be.25" '
In sum, at this early stage in our research, we find that many jurors appear
to make their decisions apart from, and indeed prior to, sentencing instruc-
tions on the bases of their unguided feelings or reactions to the crime. The
findings also show that sentencing guidelines provide "legal cover" to many
who have already made up their minds, and "legal leverage" for persuading
the undecided. In either case, the guidelines appear to lessen the sense of
responsibility for imposing an awful punishment. Yet, these are still early
soundings of what the jurors have to tell .us about how they think about the
crimes, the defendants, the victims, and how they decide what the defendant's
punishment should be. The yet unanswered critical questions, of course, are
how standardless is this decision-making process; how widespread is such
standardless decision-making; and-for the Court to answer-does it represent
a constitutionally unacceptable level or risk of arbitrariness? We agree with
then-Justice Rehnquist in Lockhart that the critical answers lie in what actual
jurors who have served in real capital trials,252 such as these, have to tell us
as we dig deeper into the data.
250. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 72.
251. See Hoffinann, supra note 219.
252. See supra note I I 1 and accompanying text.
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